HackTool - Mimikatz Execution

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, category process_creation
Author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community, David ANDRE (additional keywords), Tim Shelton
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1003.001` OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, `T1003.002` OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, `T1003.004` OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, `T1003.005` OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials, `T1003.006` OS Credential Dumping: DCSync

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.

Rule body yaml

title: HackTool - Mimikatz Execution
id: a642964e-bead-4bed-8910-1bb4d63e3b4d
status: test
description: Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community, David ANDRE (additional keywords), Tim Shelton
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools_name:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DumpCreds'
            - 'mimikatz'
    selection_function_names: # To cover functions from modules that are not in module_names
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '::aadcookie' # misc module
            - '::detours' # misc module
            - '::memssp' # misc module
            - '::mflt' # misc module
            - '::ncroutemon' # misc module
            - '::ngcsign' # misc module
            - '::printnightmare' # misc module
            - '::skeleton' # misc module
            - '::preshutdown'  # service module
            - '::mstsc'  # ts module
            - '::multirdp'  # ts module
    selection_module_names:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'rpc::'
            - 'token::'
            - 'crypto::'
            - 'dpapi::'
            - 'sekurlsa::'
            - 'kerberos::'
            - 'lsadump::'
            - 'privilege::'
            - 'process::'
            - 'vault::'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

1 of selection_*

Stage 1: `selection_tools_name`

selection_tools_name:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'DumpCreds'
        - 'mimikatz'

Stage 2: `selection_function_names`

selection_function_names:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - '::aadcookie'
        - '::detours'
        - '::memssp'
        - '::mflt'
        - '::ncroutemon'
        - '::ngcsign'
        - '::printnightmare'
        - '::skeleton'
        - '::preshutdown'
        - '::mstsc'
        - '::multirdp'

Stage 3: `selection_module_names`

selection_module_names:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'rpc::'
        - 'token::'
        - 'crypto::'
        - 'dpapi::'
        - 'sekurlsa::'
        - 'kerberos::'
        - 'lsadump::'
        - 'privilege::'
        - 'process::'
        - 'vault::'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`::aadcookie` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::detours` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::memssp` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::mflt` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::mstsc` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::multirdp` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::ncroutemon` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::ngcsign` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::preshutdown` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::printnightmare` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `::skeleton` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `DumpCreds` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `crypto::` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `dpapi::` corpus 3 (sigma 2, chronicle 1) `kerberos::` corpus 3 (sigma 2, chronicle 1) `lsadump::` corpus 3 (sigma 2, chronicle 1) `mimikatz` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `privilege::` corpus 3 (sigma 2, chronicle 1) `process::` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `rpc::` corpus 3 (sigma 2, chronicle 1) `sekurlsa::` corpus 3 (sigma 2, chronicle 1) `token::` corpus 3 (sigma 2, chronicle 1) `vault::` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

HackTool - Mimikatz Execution

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_tools_name`

Stage 2: `selection_function_names`

Stage 3: `selection_module_names`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

HackTool - Mimikatz Execution

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_tools_name

Stage 2: selection_function_names

Stage 3: selection_module_names

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_tools_name`

Stage 2: `selection_function_names`

Stage 3: `selection_module_names`