Detection rules › Sigma
Attempts of Kerberos Coercion Via DNS SPN Spoofing
Detects the presence of "UWhRC....AAYBAAAA" pattern in command line. The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure. Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts. It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like in CVE-2025-33073. If you see this pattern in the command line, it is likely an attempt to add spoofed Service Principal Names (SPNs) to DNS records, or checking for the presence of such records through the nslookup command.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1187 Forced Authentication, T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay |
| Collection | T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaml
title: Attempts of Kerberos Coercion Via DNS SPN Spoofing
id: 0ed99dda-6a35-11ef-8c99-0242ac120002
related:
- id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the presence of "UWhRC....AAYBAAAA" pattern in command line.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like in CVE-2025-33073.
If you see this pattern in the command line, it is likely an attempt to add spoofed Service Principal Names (SPNs) to DNS records,
or checking for the presence of such records through the `nslookup` command.
references:
- https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-20
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1557.001
- attack.t1187
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'UWhRCA'
- 'BAAAA'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'UWhRCA'
- 'BAAAA'
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
|