Potentially Suspicious File Download From File Sharing Domain Via PowerShell.EXE

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: category process_creation, product windows
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from file sharing domains using PowerShell.exe

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	No specific technique

Telemetry coverage

Provider	Record / event type
Sysmon	Event ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

title: Potentially Suspicious File Download From File Sharing Domain Via PowerShell.EXE
id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8
related:
    - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
      type: similar
    - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
      type: similar
    - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
      type: similar
    - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
      type: similar
    - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
      type: similar
    - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
      type: similar
    - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
      type: similar
    - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
      type: similar
    - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
      type: similar
    - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c
      type: similar
    - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from file sharing domains using PowerShell.exe
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
    - https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-23
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_websites:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: You might want to baseline the github domain before including it
            # - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea).
            - '0x0.st'
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'bashupload.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'chunk.io'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            # - 'github.com'  See note above
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'pixeldrain.com'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
            - 'x0.at'
    selection_download:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.DownloadString('
            - '.DownloadFile('
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest '
            - 'iwr '
            - 'wget '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

all of selection_*

Stage 1: `selection_img`

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith:
          - '\powershell.exe'
          - '\pwsh.exe'
    - OriginalFileName:
          - 'PowerShell.EXE'
          - 'pwsh.dll'

Stage 2: `selection_websites`

selection_websites:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - '0x0.st'
        - 'anonfiles.com'
        - 'bashupload.com'
        - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
        - 'chunk.io'
        - 'ddns.net'
        - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
        - 'ghostbin.co'
        - 'glitch.me'
        - 'gofile.io'
        - 'hastebin.com'
        - 'mediafire.com'
        - 'mega.nz'
        - 'onrender.com'
        - 'pages.dev'
        - 'paste.ee'
        - 'pastebin.com'
        - 'pastebin.pl'
        - 'pastetext.net'
        - 'pixeldrain.com'
        - 'privatlab.com'
        - 'privatlab.net'
        - 'send.exploit.in'
        - 'sendspace.com'
        - 'storage.googleapis.com'
        - 'storjshare.io'
        - 'supabase.co'
        - 'temp.sh'
        - 'transfer.sh'
        - 'trycloudflare.com'
        - 'ufile.io'
        - 'w3spaces.com'
        - 'workers.dev'
        - 'x0.at'

Stage 3: `selection_download`

selection_download:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - '.DownloadString('
        - '.DownloadFile('
        - 'Invoke-WebRequest '
        - 'iwr '
        - 'wget '

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Field	Kind	Values	Search
`CommandLine`	match	`.DownloadFile(` corpus 8 (sigma 7, chronicle 1) `.DownloadString(` corpus 8 (sigma 7, chronicle 1) `0x0.st` corpus 6 (sigma 6) `Invoke-WebRequest` corpus 5 (sigma 4, chronicle 1) `anonfiles.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `bashupload.com` corpus 6 (sigma 6) `cdn.discordapp.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `chunk.io` corpus 6 (sigma 6) `ddns.net` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `dl.dropboxusercontent.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `ghostbin.co` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `glitch.me` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `gofile.io` corpus 7 (sigma 5, elastic 1, chronicle 1) `hastebin.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `iwr` corpus 13 (sigma 11, chronicle 2) `mediafire.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `mega.nz` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `onrender.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `pages.dev` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `paste.ee` corpus 7 (sigma 5, elastic 1, chronicle 1) `pastebin.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `pastebin.pl` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `pastetext.net` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `pixeldrain.com` corpus 4 (sigma 3, elastic 1) `privatlab.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `privatlab.net` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `send.exploit.in` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `sendspace.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `storage.googleapis.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `storjshare.io` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `supabase.co` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `temp.sh` corpus 7 (sigma 6, chronicle 1) `transfer.sh` corpus 8 (sigma 6, elastic 1, chronicle 1) `trycloudflare.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `ufile.io` corpus 8 (sigma 6, elastic 1, chronicle 1) `w3spaces.com` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `wget` corpus 13 (sigma 7, elastic 5, chronicle 1) `workers.dev` corpus 6 (sigma 5, chronicle 1) `x0.at` corpus 6 (sigma 6)	`field:"CommandLine" kind:match`
`Image`	ends_with	`\powershell.exe` corpus 179 (sigma 178, kusto 1) `\pwsh.exe` corpus 165 (sigma 164, kusto 1)	`field:"Image" kind:ends_with`
`OriginalFileName`	eq	`PowerShell.EXE` corpus 138 (sigma 84, splunk 30, elastic 24) `pwsh.dll` corpus 112 (sigma 79, splunk 30, elastic 3)	`field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq`

Potentially Suspicious File Download From File Sharing Domain Via PowerShell.EXE

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_img

Stage 2: selection_websites

Stage 3: selection_download

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_img`

Stage 2: `selection_websites`

Stage 3: `selection_download`