RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, category process_creation
Author: frack113
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode. RestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop. This prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1112` Modify Registry
Defense Impairment	`T1112` Modify Registry

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.

Rule body yaml

title: RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation
id: 28ac00d6-22d9-4a3c-927f-bbd770104573
related:
    - id: d6ce7ebd-260b-4323-9768-a9631c8d4db2 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode.
    RestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop.
    This prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial connection process if the remote server has been compromise
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/a8e3cf63e97b973a25903d3df9fd55da6252e564/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/32905.remote-desktop-services-enable-restricted-admin-mode.aspx
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
author: frack113
date: 2023-01-13
modified: 2025-08-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
            - 'DisableRestrictedAdmin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
        - 'DisableRestrictedAdmin'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`DisableRestrictedAdmin` corpus 3 (sigma 3) `\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa` corpus 4 (sigma 4)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`