Renamed AdFind Execution

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, category process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Discovery	`T1018` Remote System Discovery, `T1069.002` Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups, `T1087.002` Account Discovery: Domain Account, `T1482` Domain Trust Discovery

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation

Rule body yaml

title: Renamed AdFind Execution
id: df55196f-f105-44d3-a675-e9dfb6cc2f2b
status: test
description: Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2025-02-26
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domainlist'
            - 'trustdmp'
            - 'dcmodes'
            - 'adinfo'
            - ' dclist '
            - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
            - 'objectcategory='
            - '-subnets -f'
            - 'name="Domain Admins"'
            - '-sc u:'
            - 'domainncs'
            - 'dompol'
            - ' oudmp '
            - 'subnetdmp'
            - 'gpodmp'
            - 'fspdmp'
            - 'users_noexpire'
            - 'computers_active'
            - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'
    selection_2:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=BCA5675746D13A1F246E2DA3C2217492'
            - 'IMPHASH=53E117A96057EAF19C41380D0E87F1C2'
            - 'IMPHASH=d144de8117df2beceaba2201ad304764'
            - 'IMPHASH=12ce1c0f3f5837ecc18a3782408fa975'
            - 'IMPHASH=4fbf3f084fbbb2470b80b2013134df35'
            - 'IMPHASH=49b639b4acbecc49d72a01f357aa4930'
            - 'IMPHASH=680dad9e300346e05a85023965867201'
            - 'IMPHASH=21aa085d54992511b9f115355e468782'
    selection_3:
        OriginalFileName: 'AdFind.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\AdFind.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_adfind/info.yml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

1 of selection* and not filter

Stage 1: `selection_1`

selection_1:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'domainlist'
        - 'trustdmp'
        - 'dcmodes'
        - 'adinfo'
        - ' dclist '
        - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
        - 'objectcategory='
        - '-subnets -f'
        - 'name="Domain Admins"'
        - '-sc u:'
        - 'domainncs'
        - 'dompol'
        - ' oudmp '
        - 'subnetdmp'
        - 'gpodmp'
        - 'fspdmp'
        - 'users_noexpire'
        - 'computers_active'
        - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'

Stage 2: `selection_2`

selection_2:
    Hashes|contains:
        - 'IMPHASH=BCA5675746D13A1F246E2DA3C2217492'
        - 'IMPHASH=53E117A96057EAF19C41380D0E87F1C2'
        - 'IMPHASH=d144de8117df2beceaba2201ad304764'
        - 'IMPHASH=12ce1c0f3f5837ecc18a3782408fa975'
        - 'IMPHASH=4fbf3f084fbbb2470b80b2013134df35'
        - 'IMPHASH=49b639b4acbecc49d72a01f357aa4930'
        - 'IMPHASH=680dad9e300346e05a85023965867201'
        - 'IMPHASH=21aa085d54992511b9f115355e468782'

Stage 3: `selection_3`

selection_3:
    OriginalFileName: 'AdFind.exe'

Stage 4: `not filter`

filter:
    Image|endswith: '\AdFind.exe'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`Image`	ends_with	`\AdFind.exe`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`dclist` `oudmp` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `-sc u:` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `-subnets -f` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `adinfo` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `computer_pwdnotreqd` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `computers_active` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `computers_pwdnotreqd` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `dcmodes` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `domainlist` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `domainncs` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `dompol` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `fspdmp` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `gpodmp` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `name="Domain Admins"` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `objectcategory=` corpus 3 (sigma 2, splunk 1) `subnetdmp` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `trustdmp` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `users_noexpire` corpus 2 (sigma 2)
`Hashes`	match	`IMPHASH=12ce1c0f3f5837ecc18a3782408fa975` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=21aa085d54992511b9f115355e468782` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=49b639b4acbecc49d72a01f357aa4930` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=4fbf3f084fbbb2470b80b2013134df35` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=53E117A96057EAF19C41380D0E87F1C2` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=680dad9e300346e05a85023965867201` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=BCA5675746D13A1F246E2DA3C2217492` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=d144de8117df2beceaba2201ad304764` corpus 2 (sigma 2)
`OriginalFileName`	eq	`AdFind.exe` corpus 4 (sigma 2, elastic 1, splunk 1)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Renamed AdFind Execution

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_1`

Stage 2: `selection_2`

Stage 3: `selection_3`

Stage 4: `not filter`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Renamed AdFind Execution

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_1

Stage 2: selection_2

Stage 3: selection_3

Stage 4: not filter

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_1`

Stage 2: `selection_2`

Stage 3: `selection_3`

Stage 4: `not filter`