Detection rules › Sigma

Renamed PAExec Execution

Status
test
Severity
high
Log source
category process_creation, product windows
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jason Lynch
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects execution of renamed version of PAExec. Often used by attackers

Known false positives

  • Weird admins that rename their tools
  • Software companies that bundle PAExec with their software and rename it, so that it is less embarrassing
  • When executed with the "-s" flag. PAExec will copy itself to the "C:\Windows\" directory with a different name. Usually like this "PAExec-[XXXXX]-[ComputerName]"

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Stealth

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

title: Renamed PAExec Execution
id: c4e49831-1496-40cf-8ce1-b53f942b02f9
related:
    - id: 7b0666ad-3e38-4e3d-9bab-78b06de85f7b
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects execution of renamed version of PAExec. Often used by attackers
references:
    - https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/
    - https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s05-att&cking-fin7.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jason Lynch
date: 2021-05-22
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Description: 'PAExec Application'
        - OriginalFileName: 'PAExec.exe'
        - Product|contains: 'PAExec'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - IMPHASH=11D40A7B7876288F919AB819CC2D9802
              - IMPHASH=6444f8a34e99b8f7d9647de66aabe516
              - IMPHASH=dfd6aa3f7b2b1035b76b718f1ddc689f
              - IMPHASH=1a6cca4d5460b1710a12dea39e4a592c
    filter_main_known_location:
        - Image|endswith: '\paexec.exe'
        - Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\PAExec-'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Weird admins that rename their tools
    - Software companies that bundle PAExec with their software and rename it, so that it is less embarrassing
    - When executed with the "-s" flag. PAExec will copy itself to the "C:\Windows\" directory with a different name. Usually like this "PAExec-[XXXXX]-[ComputerName]"
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    - Description: 'PAExec Application'
    - OriginalFileName: 'PAExec.exe'
    - Product|contains: 'PAExec'
    - Hashes|contains:
          - IMPHASH=11D40A7B7876288F919AB819CC2D9802
          - IMPHASH=6444f8a34e99b8f7d9647de66aabe516
          - IMPHASH=dfd6aa3f7b2b1035b76b718f1ddc689f
          - IMPHASH=1a6cca4d5460b1710a12dea39e4a592c

Stage 2: not filter_main_known_location

filter_main_known_location:
    - Image|endswith: '\paexec.exe'
    - Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\PAExec-'

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Imageends_with\paexec.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\paexec.exe"
Imagestarts_withC:\Windows\PAExec-excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\PAExec-"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Descriptioneq
  • PAExec Application
field:"Description" kind:eq value:"PAExec Application"
Hashesmatch
  • IMPHASH=11D40A7B7876288F919AB819CC2D9802
  • IMPHASH=1a6cca4d5460b1710a12dea39e4a592c
  • IMPHASH=6444f8a34e99b8f7d9647de66aabe516
  • IMPHASH=dfd6aa3f7b2b1035b76b718f1ddc689f
field:"Hashes" kind:match
OriginalFileNameeq
  • PAExec.exe
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"PAExec.exe"
Productmatch
  • PAExec
field:"Product" kind:match value:"PAExec"