Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, category process_creation
Author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which makes the service hidden and unremovable.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1574.011` Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
Stealth	`T1574.011` Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation

Rule body yaml

title: Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE
id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0
related:
    - id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37 # Deny Service Access
      type: similar
    - id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 # Generic SD tampering
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which makes the service hidden and unremovable.
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
    - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
    - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2022-08-08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sdset'
            # Summary of permissions
            #   DC: Delete All Child Objects
            #   LC: List Contents
            #   WP: Write All Properties
            #   DT: Delete Subtree
            #   SD: Delete
            - 'DCLCWPDTSD'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

all of selection_*

Stage 1: `selection_img`

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'

Stage 2: `selection_cli`

selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'sdset'
        - 'DCLCWPDTSD'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`DCLCWPDTSD` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `sdset` corpus 5 (sigma 5)
`Image`	ends_with	`\sc.exe` corpus 30 (sigma 30)
`OriginalFileName`	eq	`sc.exe` corpus 26 (sigma 12, splunk 10, elastic 4)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_img`

Stage 2: `selection_cli`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_img

Stage 2: selection_cli

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_img`

Stage 2: `selection_cli`