Potential Persistence Attempt Via Existing Service Tampering

Status: test
Severity: medium
Log source: product windows, category process_creation
Author: Sreeman
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the modification of an existing service in order to execute an arbitrary payload when the service is started or killed as a potential method for persistence.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1574.011` Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
Persistence	`T1543.003` Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Privilege Escalation	`T1543.003` Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Stealth	`T1574.011` Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.

Rule body yaml

title: Potential Persistence Attempt Via Existing Service Tampering
id: 38879043-7e1e-47a9-8d46-6bec88e201df
status: test
description: Detects the modification of an existing service in order to execute an arbitrary payload when the service is started or killed as a potential method for persistence.
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-09-29
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sc:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'sc '
              - 'config '
              - 'binpath='
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'sc '
              - 'failure'
              - 'command='
    selection_reg_img:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'reg '
              - 'add '
              - 'FailureCommand'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'reg '
              - 'add '
              - 'ImagePath'
    selection_reg_ext:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.sh'
            - '.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - '.bin$'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.js'
            - '.msh$'
            - '.reg$'
            - '.scr'
            - '.ps'
            - '.vb'
            - '.jar'
            - '.pl'
    condition: selection_sc or all of selection_reg_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection_sc or all of selection_reg_*

Stage 1: `selection_sc`

selection_sc:
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
          - 'sc '
          - 'config '
          - 'binpath='
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
          - 'sc '
          - 'failure'
          - 'command='

Stage 2: `selection_reg_img`

selection_reg_img:
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
          - 'reg '
          - 'add '
          - 'FailureCommand'
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
          - 'reg '
          - 'add '
          - 'ImagePath'

Stage 3: `selection_reg_ext`

selection_reg_ext:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - '.sh'
        - '.exe'
        - '.dll'
        - '.bin$'
        - '.bat'
        - '.cmd'
        - '.js'
        - '.msh$'
        - '.reg$'
        - '.scr'
        - '.ps'
        - '.vb'
        - '.jar'
        - '.pl'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`.bat` corpus 11 (sigma 9, elastic 1, kusto 1) `.bin$` `.cmd` corpus 6 (sigma 5, elastic 1) `.dll` corpus 16 (sigma 16) `.exe` corpus 5 (sigma 5) `.jar` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `.js` corpus 9 (sigma 9) `.msh$` `.pl` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `.ps` corpus 3 (sigma 3) `.reg$` `.scr` corpus 5 (sigma 5) `.sh` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `.vb` corpus 3 (sigma 3) `FailureCommand` corpus 3 (sigma 3) `ImagePath` corpus 3 (sigma 3) `add` corpus 12 (sigma 12) `binpath=` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `command=` `config` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `failure` corpus 3 (sigma 3) `reg` corpus 5 (sigma 5) `sc`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Potential Persistence Attempt Via Existing Service Tampering

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_sc`

Stage 2: `selection_reg_img`

Stage 3: `selection_reg_ext`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Potential Persistence Attempt Via Existing Service Tampering

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_sc

Stage 2: selection_reg_img

Stage 3: selection_reg_ext

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_sc`

Stage 2: `selection_reg_img`

Stage 3: `selection_reg_ext`