Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, category process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1047` Windows Management Instrumentation

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.

Rule body yaml

title: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
id: 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8
related:
    - id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d # Generic
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'process '
            - 'call '
            - 'create '
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more susupicious paths and binaries as you see fit in your env
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'mshta'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%ProgramData%'
            - '%appdata%'
            - '%comspec%'
            - '%localappdata%'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'process '
        - 'call '
        - 'create '
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'rundll32'
        - 'bitsadmin'
        - 'regsvr32'
        - 'cmd.exe /c '
        - 'cmd.exe /k '
        - 'cmd.exe /r '
        - 'cmd /c '
        - 'cmd /k '
        - 'cmd /r '
        - 'powershell'
        - 'pwsh'
        - 'certutil'
        - 'cscript'
        - 'wscript'
        - 'mshta'
        - '\Users\Public\'
        - '\Windows\Temp\'
        - '\AppData\Local\'
        - '%temp%'
        - '%tmp%'
        - '%ProgramData%'
        - '%appdata%'
        - '%comspec%'
        - '%localappdata%'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`%ProgramData%` corpus 4 (sigma 4) `%appdata%` corpus 13 (sigma 11, chronicle 2) `%comspec%` corpus 6 (sigma 5, splunk 1) `%localappdata%` corpus 4 (sigma 4) `%temp%` corpus 16 (sigma 13, chronicle 2, kusto 1) `%tmp%` corpus 15 (sigma 13, chronicle 2) `\AppData\Local\` corpus 10 (sigma 10) `\Users\Public\` corpus 17 (sigma 17) `\Windows\Temp\` corpus 12 (sigma 12) `bitsadmin` corpus 10 (sigma 10) `call` `certutil` corpus 12 (sigma 10, kusto 2) `cmd /c` corpus 4 (sigma 4) `cmd /k` corpus 4 (sigma 4) `cmd /r` corpus 4 (sigma 4) `cmd.exe /c` corpus 6 (sigma 6) `cmd.exe /k` corpus 5 (sigma 5) `cmd.exe /r` corpus 5 (sigma 5) `create` `cscript` corpus 15 (sigma 15) `mshta` corpus 14 (sigma 14) `powershell` corpus 25 (sigma 24, chronicle 1) `process` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `pwsh` corpus 7 (sigma 7) `regsvr32` corpus 15 (sigma 15) `rundll32` corpus 26 (sigma 23, chronicle 2, kusto 1) `wscript` corpus 16 (sigma 16)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`