XSL Script Execution Via WMIC.EXE

Status: test
Severity: medium
Log source: product windows, category process_creation
Author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the execution of WMIC with the "format" flag to potentially load local XSL files. Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1047` Windows Management Instrumentation, `T1059.005` Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, `T1059.007` Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
Stealth	`T1220` XSL Script Processing

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation

Rule body yaml

title: XSL Script Execution Via WMIC.EXE
id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d
related:
    - id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32
      type: similar
    - id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of WMIC with the "format" flag to potentially load local XSL files.
    Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.
    Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1220/T1220.md
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2019-10-21
modified: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1220
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Hashes|contains:  # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
              - 'IMPHASH=1B1A3F43BF37B5BFE60751F2EE2F326E'
              - 'IMPHASH=37777A96245A3C74EB217308F3546F4C'
              - 'IMPHASH=9D87C9D67CE724033C0B40CC4CA1B206'
              - 'IMPHASH=B12619881D79C3ACADF45E752A58554A'
              - 'IMPHASH=16A48C3CABF98A9DC1BF02C07FE1EA00'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-format:'     # wmic process list -FORMAT /? or wmic process list /FORMAT /?
    filter_main_known_format:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Format:List'
            - 'Format:htable'
            - 'Format:hform'
            - 'Format:table'
            - 'Format:mof'
            - 'Format:value'
            - 'Format:rawxml'
            - 'Format:xml'
            - 'Format:csv'
    filter_main_remote_operation: # Covered by 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://'
            - '\\\\'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - WMIC.exe FP depend on scripts and administrative methods used in the monitored environment.
    - Static format arguments - https://petri.com/command-line-wmi-part-3
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*

Stage 1: `selection_img`

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    - Hashes|contains:
          - 'IMPHASH=1B1A3F43BF37B5BFE60751F2EE2F326E'
          - 'IMPHASH=37777A96245A3C74EB217308F3546F4C'
          - 'IMPHASH=9D87C9D67CE724033C0B40CC4CA1B206'
          - 'IMPHASH=B12619881D79C3ACADF45E752A58554A'
          - 'IMPHASH=16A48C3CABF98A9DC1BF02C07FE1EA00'

Stage 2: `selection_cmd`

selection_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains|windash: '-format:'

Stage 3: `not filter_main_*`

filter_main_known_format:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'Format:List'
        - 'Format:htable'
        - 'Format:hform'
        - 'Format:table'
        - 'Format:mof'
        - 'Format:value'
        - 'Format:rawxml'
        - 'Format:xml'
        - 'Format:csv'
filter_main_remote_operation:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - '://'
        - '\\\\'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`CommandLine`	match	`://`
`CommandLine`	match	`Format:List`
`CommandLine`	match	`Format:csv`
`CommandLine`	match	`Format:hform`
`CommandLine`	match	`Format:htable`
`CommandLine`	match	`Format:mof`
`CommandLine`	match	`Format:rawxml`
`CommandLine`	match	`Format:table`
`CommandLine`	match	`Format:value`
`CommandLine`	match	`Format:xml`
`CommandLine`	match	`\\\\`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`-format:` transforms: `windash`
`Hashes`	match	`IMPHASH=16A48C3CABF98A9DC1BF02C07FE1EA00` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=1B1A3F43BF37B5BFE60751F2EE2F326E` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=37777A96245A3C74EB217308F3546F4C` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=9D87C9D67CE724033C0B40CC4CA1B206` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `IMPHASH=B12619881D79C3ACADF45E752A58554A` corpus 2 (sigma 2)
`Image`	ends_with	`\wmic.exe` corpus 60 (sigma 60)
`OriginalFileName`	eq	`wmic.exe` corpus 61 (sigma 36, splunk 18, elastic 7)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

XSL Script Execution Via WMIC.EXE

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_img`

Stage 2: `selection_cmd`

Stage 3: `not filter_main_*`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

XSL Script Execution Via WMIC.EXE

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_img

Stage 2: selection_cmd

Stage 3: not filter_main_*

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_img`

Stage 2: `selection_cmd`

Stage 3: `not filter_main_*`