Windows Registry Trust Record Modification

Status: test
Severity: medium
Log source: product windows, category registry_event
Author: Antonlovesdnb, Trent Liffick (@tliffick)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Alerts on trust record modification within the registry, indicating usage of macros

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1566.001` Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 12	RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)
Sysmon	Event ID 13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)
Sysmon	Event ID 14	RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)

Rule body yaml

title: Windows Registry Trust Record Modification
id: 295a59c1-7b79-4b47-a930-df12c15fc9c2
related:
    - id: a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd
      type: similar
status: test
description: Alerts on trust record modification within the registry, indicating usage of macros
references:
    - https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/01/16/hunting-for-evil-detect-macros-being-executed/
    - http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2016/02/more-on-trust-records-macros-and.html
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
author: Antonlovesdnb, Trent Liffick (@tliffick)
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-06-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - This will alert on legitimate macro usage as well, additional tuning is required
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
    TargetObject|contains: '\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`TargetObject`	match	`\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords` corpus 2 (sigma 2)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Windows Registry Trust Record Modification

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Windows Registry Trust Record Modification

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`