CurrentControlSet Autorun Keys Modification

Status: test
Severity: medium
Log source: product windows, category registry_set
Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1547.001` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Privilege Escalation	`T1547.001` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)

Rule body yaml

title: CurrentControlSet Autorun Keys Modification
id: f674e36a-4b91-431e-8aef-f8a96c2aca35
related:
    - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
    - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d # a list with registry keys
author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    system_control_base:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control'
    system_control_keys:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram'
            - '\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd\StartupPrograms'
            - '\SecurityProviders\SecurityProviders'
            - '\SafeBoot\AlternateShell'
            - '\Print\Providers'
            - '\Print\Monitors'
            - '\NetworkProvider\Order'
            - '\Lsa\Notification Packages'
            - '\Lsa\Authentication Packages'
            - '\BootVerificationProgram\ImagePath'
    filter_empty:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_cutepdf:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe'
        TargetObject|contains: '\Print\Monitors\CutePDF Writer Monitor'
        Details:
            - 'cpwmon64_v40.dll'
            - 'CutePDF Writer'
    filter_onenote:
        Image: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
        TargetObject|contains: 'Print\Monitors\Appmon\Ports\Microsoft.Office.OneNote_'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    filter_poqexec:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\NetworkProvider\Order\ProviderOrder'
    filter_realvnc:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Print\Monitors\MONVNC\Driver'
        Details: 'VNCpm.dll'
    condition: all of system_control_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
    - Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

all of system_control_* and not 1 of filter_*

Stage 1: `system_control_base`

system_control_base:
    TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control'

Stage 2: `system_control_keys`

system_control_keys:
    TargetObject|contains:
        - '\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram'
        - '\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd\StartupPrograms'
        - '\SecurityProviders\SecurityProviders'
        - '\SafeBoot\AlternateShell'
        - '\Print\Providers'
        - '\Print\Monitors'
        - '\NetworkProvider\Order'
        - '\Lsa\Notification Packages'
        - '\Lsa\Authentication Packages'
        - '\BootVerificationProgram\ImagePath'

Stage 3: `not filter_*`

filter_empty:
    Details: '(Empty)'
filter_cutepdf:
    Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe'
    TargetObject|contains: '\Print\Monitors\CutePDF Writer Monitor'
    Details:
        - 'cpwmon64_v40.dll'
        - 'CutePDF Writer'
filter_onenote:
    Image: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
    TargetObject|contains: 'Print\Monitors\Appmon\Ports\Microsoft.Office.OneNote_'
    User|contains:
        - 'AUTHORI'
        - 'AUTORI'
filter_poqexec:
    Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe'
    TargetObject|endswith: '\NetworkProvider\Order\ProviderOrder'
filter_realvnc:
    Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe'
    TargetObject|endswith: '\Print\Monitors\MONVNC\Driver'
    Details: 'VNCpm.dll'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`Details`	eq	`CutePDF Writer`
`Details`	eq	`cpwmon64_v40.dll`
`Image`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe`
`TargetObject`	match	`\Print\Monitors\CutePDF Writer Monitor`
`User`	match	`AUTHORI`
`User`	match	`AUTORI`
`Image`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe`
`TargetObject`	match	`Print\Monitors\Appmon\Ports\Microsoft.Office.OneNote_`
`Details`	eq	`VNCpm.dll`
`Image`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe`
`TargetObject`	ends_with	`\Print\Monitors\MONVNC\Driver`
`Image`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe`
`TargetObject`	ends_with	`\NetworkProvider\Order\ProviderOrder`
`Details`	eq	`(Empty)`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`TargetObject`	match	`\BootVerificationProgram\ImagePath` `\Lsa\Authentication Packages` `\Lsa\Notification Packages` `\NetworkProvider\Order` `\Print\Monitors` `\Print\Providers` `\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control` `\SafeBoot\AlternateShell` `\SecurityProviders\SecurityProviders` `\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd\StartupPrograms` `\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

CurrentControlSet Autorun Keys Modification

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `system_control_base`

Stage 2: `system_control_keys`

Stage 3: `not filter_*`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

CurrentControlSet Autorun Keys Modification

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: system_control_base

Stage 2: system_control_keys

Stage 3: not filter_*

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `system_control_base`

Stage 2: `system_control_keys`

Stage 3: `not filter_*`