Detection rules › Sigma
Potential AutoLogger Sessions Tampering
Detects tampering with autologger trace sessions which is a technique used by attackers to disable logging. The AutoLogger event tracing session records events up that occur early in the operating system boot process. Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in, and also used by security solutions as telemetry source. Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule body
title: Potential AutoLogger Sessions Tampering
id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
related:
- id: d7b81144-b866-48a4-9bcc-275dc69d870e
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects tampering with autologger trace sessions which is a technique used by attackers to disable logging.
The AutoLogger event tracing session records events up that occur early in the operating system boot process.
Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in, and also used by security solutions as telemetry source.
Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
references:
- https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
- https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2025-12-26
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_main:
TargetObject|contains: '\Control\WMI\Autologger\'
selection_values:
TargetObject|contains: # We only care about some autologger to avoid FP. Add more if you need
- '\EventLog-'
- '\Defender'
TargetObject|endswith:
- '\Enabled'
- '\Start'
Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
filter_main_wevtutil:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\wevtutil.exe'
filter_main_defender:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\'
Image|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
TargetObject|contains:
- '\DefenderApiLogger\'
- '\DefenderAuditLogger\'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_autologger_sessions/info.yml
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - Cmd
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 653c6e17-14a2-4849-851d-f1c0cc8ea9ab
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - PowerShell
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: da86f239-9bd3-4e85-92ed-4a94ef111a1c
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - Cmd
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 1cac9b54-810e-495c-8aac-989e0076583b
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - PowerShell
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 8f907648-1ebf-4276-b0f0-e2678ca474f0
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*Stage 1: selection_main
selection_main:
TargetObject|contains: '\Control\WMI\Autologger\'
Stage 2: selection_values
selection_values:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\EventLog-'
- '\Defender'
TargetObject|endswith:
- '\Enabled'
- '\Start'
Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
Stage 3: not filter_main_*
filter_main_wevtutil:
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\wevtutil.exe'
filter_main_defender:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\'
Image|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
TargetObject|contains:
- '\DefenderApiLogger\'
- '\DefenderAuditLogger\'
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | starts_with | C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\" |
Image | starts_with | C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\" |
Image | starts_with | C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\" |
TargetObject | match | \DefenderApiLogger\ | excludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"\DefenderApiLogger\" |
TargetObject | match | \DefenderAuditLogger\ | excludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"\DefenderAuditLogger\" |
Image | ends_with | \MsMpEng.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\MsMpEng.exe" |
Image | eq | C:\Windows\system32\wevtutil.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\system32\wevtutil.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Details | eq |
| field:"Details" kind:eq value:"DWORD (0x00000000)" |
TargetObject | ends_with |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:ends_with |
TargetObject | match |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:match |