Detection rules › Sigma
Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
Known false positives
- Administrative activity, still unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule body
title: Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
id: ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156
status: experimental
description: |
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
references:
- https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.002#atomic-test-8---modify-event-log-channel-access-permissions-via-registry---powershell
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSYvHUVU8xY
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language
author: X__Junior
date: 2025-01-16
modified: 2025-08-16
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.t1112
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
# O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)
# O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-2-1)(D;;0x1;;;WD)
selection_key_1:
TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\'
TargetObject|endswith: '\CustomSD'
selection_key_2:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\'
- '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels'
TargetObject|endswith: '\ChannelAccess'
selection_details:
- Details|contains: 'D:(D;'
- Details|contains|all:
- 'D:('
- ')(D;'
filter_main_trustedinstaller:
Image: 'C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe'
filter_main_tiworker:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
filter_optional_empty:
Image: ''
filter_optional_null:
Image: null
condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative activity, still unlikely
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection_key_1
selection_key_1:
TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\'
TargetObject|endswith: '\CustomSD'
Stage 2: selection_key_2
selection_key_2:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\'
- '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels'
TargetObject|endswith: '\ChannelAccess'
Stage 3: selection_details
selection_details:
- Details|contains: 'D:(D;'
- Details|contains|all:
- 'D:('
- ')(D;'
Stage 4: not filter_main_*
filter_main_trustedinstaller:
Image: 'C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe'
filter_main_tiworker:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
Stage 5: not filter_optional_*
filter_optional_empty:
Image: ''
filter_optional_null:
Image: null
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with | \TiWorker.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\TiWorker.exe" |
Image | starts_with | C:\Windows\WinSxS\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\WinSxS\" |
Image | eq | C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe" |
Image | is_null | excludes:Image |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Details | match |
| field:"Details" kind:match |
TargetObject | ends_with |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:ends_with |
TargetObject | match |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:match |