Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, category registry_set
Author: AlertIQ, Ján Trenčanský, frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects when attackers or tools disable Windows Defender functionalities via the Windows registry

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Defense Impairment	`T1685` Disable or Modify Tools

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)

Rule body yaml

title: Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys
id: 0eb46774-f1ab-4a74-8238-1155855f2263
related:
    - id: a64e4198-c1c8-46a5-bc9c-324c86455fd4
      type: obsolete
    - id: fd115e64-97c7-491f-951c-fc8da7e042fa
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects when attackers or tools disable Windows Defender functionalities via the Windows registry
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://gist.github.com/anadr/7465a9fde63d41341136949f14c21105
    - https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_7_2008R2&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.WindowsDefender::SpyNetReporting
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
    - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/32236-enable-disable-microsoft-defender-pua-protection-windows-10-a.html
    - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/105533-enable-disable-windows-defender-exploit-protection-settings.html
    - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/123792-turn-off-tamper-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html
    - https://securelist.com/key-group-ransomware-samples-and-telegram-schemes/114025/
author: AlertIQ, Ján Trenčanský, frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2024-10-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center\'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    selection_dword_1:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\DisableAntiSpyware'
            - '\DisableAntiVirus'
            - '\DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
            - '\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen'
            - '\DisableEnhancedNotifications'
            - '\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem'
            - '\DisableIOAVProtection'
            - '\DisableOnAccessProtection'
            - '\DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
            - '\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable'
            - '\DisableScriptScanning'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    selection_dword_0:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride'
            - '\Features\TamperProtection'
            - '\MpEngine\MpEnablePus'
            - '\PUAProtection'
            - '\Signature Update\ForceUpdateFromMU'
            - '\SpyNet\SpynetReporting'
            - '\SpyNet\SubmitSamplesConsent'
            - '\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder Access\EnableControlledFolderAccess'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    filter_optional_symantec:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\'
        Image|endswith: '\sepWscSvc64.exe'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_dword_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrator actions via the Windows Defender interface
    - Third party Antivirus
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection_main and 1 of selection_dword_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Stage 1: `selection_main`

selection_main:
    TargetObject|contains:
        - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
        - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center\'
        - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'

Stage 2: `selection_dword_1`

selection_dword_1:
    TargetObject|endswith:
        - '\DisableAntiSpyware'
        - '\DisableAntiVirus'
        - '\DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
        - '\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen'
        - '\DisableEnhancedNotifications'
        - '\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem'
        - '\DisableIOAVProtection'
        - '\DisableOnAccessProtection'
        - '\DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
        - '\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable'
        - '\DisableScriptScanning'
    Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'

Stage 3: `selection_dword_0`

selection_dword_0:
    TargetObject|endswith:
        - '\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride'
        - '\Features\TamperProtection'
        - '\MpEngine\MpEnablePus'
        - '\PUAProtection'
        - '\Signature Update\ForceUpdateFromMU'
        - '\SpyNet\SpynetReporting'
        - '\SpyNet\SubmitSamplesConsent'
        - '\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder Access\EnableControlledFolderAccess'
    Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'

Stage 4: `not filter_optional_symantec`

filter_optional_symantec:
    Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\'
    Image|endswith: '\sepWscSvc64.exe'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`Image`	ends_with	`\sepWscSvc64.exe`
`Image`	starts_with	`C:\Program Files\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Details`	eq	`DWORD (0x00000000)` corpus 38 (sigma 36, chronicle 2) `DWORD (0x00000001)` corpus 40 (sigma 36, chronicle 4)
`TargetObject`	ends_with	`\DisableAntiSpyware` `\DisableAntiVirus` `\DisableBehaviorMonitoring` `\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen` `\DisableEnhancedNotifications` `\DisableIOAVProtection` `\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem` `\DisableOnAccessProtection` `\DisableRealtimeMonitoring` `\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable` `\DisableScriptScanning` `\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride` `\Features\TamperProtection` `\MpEngine\MpEnablePus` `\PUAProtection` `\Signature Update\ForceUpdateFromMU` `\SpyNet\SpynetReporting` `\SpyNet\SubmitSamplesConsent` `\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder Access\EnableControlledFolderAccess`
`TargetObject`	match	`\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\` `\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center\` `\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_main`

Stage 2: `selection_dword_1`

Stage 3: `selection_dword_0`

Stage 4: `not filter_optional_symantec`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_main

Stage 2: selection_dword_1

Stage 3: selection_dword_0

Stage 4: not filter_optional_symantec

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_main`

Stage 2: `selection_dword_1`

Stage 3: `selection_dword_0`

Stage 4: `not filter_optional_symantec`