macOS System Integrity Protection Modification Attempt

Status: experimental
Severity: critical
Log source: product macos, service unifiedlog
Author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
Source: github.com/Nebulock-Inc/macos-coresigma

Detects attempts to modify or bypass System Integrity Protection (SIP), which protects critical system files and processes. Disabling SIP is a common step in rootkit installation and advanced malware attacks.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1562.001` Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools

Rule body yaml

title: macOS System Integrity Protection Modification Attempt
id: a7b8c9d0-e1f2-4345-0123-456789012345
status: experimental
description: |
  Detects attempts to modify or bypass System Integrity Protection (SIP),
  which protects critical system files and processes. Disabling SIP is a
  common step in rootkit installation and advanced malware attacks.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
  - https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204899
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/01/22
modified: 2025/01/22
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: unifiedlog
detection:
  selection_subsystem:
    subsystem: com.apple.syspolicy
  selection_sip:
    message|contains:
      - 'System Integrity Protection'
      - 'SIP'
      - 'csrutil'
      - 'rootless'
      - 'protected'
  selection_modification:
    message|contains:
      - 'disable'
      - 'disabled'
      - 'bypass'
      - 'violation'
      - 'denied'
      - 'blocked'
  condition: selection_subsystem and selection_sip and selection_modification
falsepositives:
  - Security researchers in controlled environments
  - System administrators performing legitimate tasks
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1562.001

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection_subsystem and selection_sip and selection_modification

Stage 1: `selection_subsystem`

selection_subsystem:
  subsystem: com.apple.syspolicy

Stage 2: `selection_sip`

selection_sip:
  message|contains:
    - 'System Integrity Protection'
    - 'SIP'
    - 'csrutil'
    - 'rootless'
    - 'protected'

Stage 3: `selection_modification`

selection_modification:
  message|contains:
    - 'disable'
    - 'disabled'
    - 'bypass'
    - 'violation'
    - 'denied'
    - 'blocked'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`message`	match	`SIP` `System Integrity Protection` `blocked` `bypass` `csrutil` `denied` `disable` `disabled` `protected` `rootless` `violation`
`subsystem`	eq	`com.apple.syspolicy`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

macOS System Integrity Protection Modification Attempt

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_subsystem`

Stage 2: `selection_sip`

Stage 3: `selection_modification`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

macOS System Integrity Protection Modification Attempt

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_subsystem

Stage 2: selection_sip

Stage 3: selection_modification

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_subsystem`

Stage 2: `selection_sip`

Stage 3: `selection_modification`