Potential Exploitation of CVE-2025-4427/4428 Ivanti EPMM Pre-Auth RCE

Status: experimental
Severity: high
Log source: category webserver
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects potential exploitation of a chained vulnerability attack targeting Ivanti EPMM 12.5.0.0. CVE-2025-4427 allows unauthenticated access to protected API endpoints via an authentication bypass, which can then be leveraged to trigger CVE-2025-4428 — a remote code execution vulnerability through template injection. This sequence enables unauthenticated remote code execution, significantly increasing the impact of exploitation.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1190` Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution	`T1203` Exploitation for Client Execution

Rule body yaml

title: Potential Exploitation of CVE-2025-4427/4428 Ivanti EPMM Pre-Auth RCE
id: 41956f7c-7a6b-46d6-b6bb-da6eb2e83fbe
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects potential exploitation of a chained vulnerability attack targeting Ivanti EPMM 12.5.0.0.
    CVE-2025-4427 allows unauthenticated access to protected API endpoints via an authentication bypass,
    which can then be leveraged to trigger CVE-2025-4428 — a remote code execution vulnerability through
    template injection. This sequence enables unauthenticated remote code execution, significantly increasing
    the impact of exploitation.
references:
    - https://labs.watchtowr.com/expression-payloads-meet-mayhem-cve-2025-4427-and-cve-2025-4428/?123
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-05-20
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - cve.2025-4427
    - cve.2025-4428
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_uri:
        cs-uri-stem|contains: '/mifs/rs/api/v2/featureusage'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 'format='
    selection_exploit_rce:
        - cs-uri-query|contains|all:
              - 'java.lang.Runtime'
              - '.getMethod'
              - 'getRuntime'
              - '.exec('
        - cs-uri-query|contains|all:
              - 'java%2elang%2eRuntime' # java.lang.Runtime
              - '%2egetMethod' # .getMethod
              - '%2eexec%28' # .exec(
        - cs-uri-query|contains:
              - '%6a%61%76%61%2e%6c%61%6e%67%2e%52%75%6e%74%69%6d%65%65%28%29' # java.lang.Runtime
              - '%67%65%74%52%75%6e%74%69%6d%65' # getRuntime
              - '%2e%65%78%65%63%28' # .exec(
    selection_exploit_template_injection:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '{7*7}'
            - '%7B7*7%7D'
            - '%7b7%2a7%7d'
    condition: selection_uri and 1 of selection_exploit_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection_uri and 1 of selection_exploit_*

Stage 1: `selection_uri`

selection_uri:
    cs-uri-stem|contains: '/mifs/rs/api/v2/featureusage'
    cs-uri-query|contains: 'format='

Stage 2: `selection_exploit_rce`

selection_exploit_rce:
    - cs-uri-query|contains|all:
          - 'java.lang.Runtime'
          - '.getMethod'
          - 'getRuntime'
          - '.exec('
    - cs-uri-query|contains|all:
          - 'java%2elang%2eRuntime'
          - '%2egetMethod'
          - '%2eexec%28'
    - cs-uri-query|contains:
          - '%6a%61%76%61%2e%6c%61%6e%67%2e%52%75%6e%74%69%6d%65%65%28%29'
          - '%67%65%74%52%75%6e%74%69%6d%65'
          - '%2e%65%78%65%63%28'

Stage 3: `selection_exploit_template_injection`

selection_exploit_template_injection:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
        - '{7*7}'
        - '%7B7*7%7D'
        - '%7b7%2a7%7d'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`cs-uri-query`	match	`%2e%65%78%65%63%28` `%2eexec%28` `%2egetMethod` `%67%65%74%52%75%6e%74%69%6d%65` `%6a%61%76%61%2e%6c%61%6e%67%2e%52%75%6e%74%69%6d%65%65%28%29` `%7B77%7D` `%7b7%2a7%7d` `.exec(` `.getMethod` `format=` `getRuntime` `java%2elang%2eRuntime` `java.lang.Runtime` `{77}`
`cs-uri-stem`	match	`/mifs/rs/api/v2/featureusage`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Potential Exploitation of CVE-2025-4427/4428 Ivanti EPMM Pre-Auth RCE

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_uri`

Stage 2: `selection_exploit_rce`

Stage 3: `selection_exploit_template_injection`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Potential Exploitation of CVE-2025-4427/4428 Ivanti EPMM Pre-Auth RCE

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_uri

Stage 2: selection_exploit_rce

Stage 3: selection_exploit_template_injection

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_uri`

Stage 2: `selection_exploit_rce`

Stage 3: `selection_exploit_template_injection`