Detection rules › Sigma

Kerberos TGS ticket request related to a potential Golden ticket

Status
experimental
Severity
high
Log source
product windows, service security
Author
mdecrevoisier
Source
github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules

Detects scenarios where an attacker request a potential Golden ticket. Findings returned by this rule may not confirm at 100% that a Golden ticket was generated and further investigations would be required to confirm it. Another indicator (in case of a lazy Golden ticket) to check would be to check if the TargetUserName refers to an existing user in the domain.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

title: Kerberos TGS ticket request related to a potential Golden ticket
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker request a potential Golden ticket. Findings returned by this rule may not confirm at 100% that a Golden ticket was generated and further investigations would be required to confirm it. Another indicator (in case of a lazy Golden ticket) to check would be to check if the TargetUserName refers to an existing user in the domain.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1558-Steal%20or%20Forge%20Kerberos%20Tickets
- https://infosecwriteups.com/forest-an-asreproast-dcsync-and-golden-ticket-hackthebox-walkthrough-ade8dcdd1ee5
- https://attack.stealthbits.com/how-golden-ticket-attack-works
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/domain-persistence-golden-ticket-attack/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://en.it-pirate.eu/azure-atp-golden-ticket-attack-how-golden-ticket-attacks-work/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberos-golden-tickets
- https://bond-o.medium.com/golden-ticket-attack-ea89553cf9c0
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Metcalf-Red-Vs-Blue-Modern-Active-Directory-Attacks-Detection-And-Protection-wp.pdf
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1558.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4768
    TargetDomainName|re: <domain_in_lowercase.xxx> # adapt REGEXP according your SIEM
    TicketOptions:
      - 0x40810000
      - 0x60810010 # ServiceName: krbtgt
    TicketEncryptionType: 0x12
    Status: 0x0
  filter:
    IpAddress:
      - '::1'
      - '127.0.0.1'
      - '%domain_controllers_ips%' # reduce amount of false positives
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not filter

Stage 1: selection

selection:
  EventID: 4768
  TargetDomainName|re: <domain_in_lowercase.xxx>
  TicketOptions:
    - 0x40810000
    - 0x60810010
  TicketEncryptionType: 0x12
  Status: 0x0

Stage 2: not filter

filter:
  IpAddress:
    - '::1'
    - '127.0.0.1'
    - '%domain_controllers_ips%'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

FieldKindExcluded values
IpAddresseq%domain_controllers_ips%
IpAddresseq127.0.0.1
IpAddresseq::1

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Statuseq
  • 0 corpus 7 (sigma 7)
TargetDomainNameregex_match
  • <domain_in_lowercase.xxx>
TicketEncryptionTypeeq
  • 18
TicketOptionseq
  • 1082195968
  • 1619066896