Detection rules › Sigma
Kerberos TGS ticket request related to a potential Golden ticket
Detects scenarios where an attacker request a potential Golden ticket. Findings returned by this rule may not confirm at 100% that a Golden ticket was generated and further investigations would be required to confirm it. Another indicator (in case of a lazy Golden ticket) to check would be to check if the TargetUserName refers to an existing user in the domain.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1558.001 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4768 | A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. |
Rule body yaml
title: Kerberos TGS ticket request related to a potential Golden ticket
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker request a potential Golden ticket. Findings returned by this rule may not confirm at 100% that a Golden ticket was generated and further investigations would be required to confirm it. Another indicator (in case of a lazy Golden ticket) to check would be to check if the TargetUserName refers to an existing user in the domain.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1558-Steal%20or%20Forge%20Kerberos%20Tickets
- https://infosecwriteups.com/forest-an-asreproast-dcsync-and-golden-ticket-hackthebox-walkthrough-ade8dcdd1ee5
- https://attack.stealthbits.com/how-golden-ticket-attack-works
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/domain-persistence-golden-ticket-attack/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://en.it-pirate.eu/azure-atp-golden-ticket-attack-how-golden-ticket-attacks-work/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberos-golden-tickets
- https://bond-o.medium.com/golden-ticket-attack-ea89553cf9c0
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Metcalf-Red-Vs-Blue-Modern-Active-Directory-Attacks-Detection-And-Protection-wp.pdf
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1558.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4768
TargetDomainName|re: <domain_in_lowercase.xxx> # adapt REGEXP according your SIEM
TicketOptions:
- 0x40810000
- 0x60810010 # ServiceName: krbtgt
TicketEncryptionType: 0x12
Status: 0x0
filter:
IpAddress:
- '::1'
- '127.0.0.1'
- '%domain_controllers_ips%' # reduce amount of false positives
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 4768
TargetDomainName|re: <domain_in_lowercase.xxx>
TicketOptions:
- 0x40810000
- 0x60810010
TicketEncryptionType: 0x12
Status: 0x0
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
IpAddress:
- '::1'
- '127.0.0.1'
- '%domain_controllers_ips%'
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
IpAddress | eq | %domain_controllers_ips% |
IpAddress | eq | 127.0.0.1 |
IpAddress | eq | ::1 |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Status | eq |
|
TargetDomainName | regex_match |
|
TicketEncryptionType | eq |
|
TicketOptions | eq |
|