Detection rules › Sigma
Computer account created with privileges
Detects scenarios where an attacker creates a computer account with privileges for later exploitation.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1098 Account Manipulation, T1136 Create Account |
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1098 Account Manipulation |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4741 | A computer account was created. |
Rule body yaml
title: Computer account created with privileges
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker creates a computer account with privileges for later exploitation.
correlation: correlate with ID 4763 (privileges) using field SubjectLogonId. See rule "Privilege SeMachineAccountPrivilege abuse" for advance correlation.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1136-Create%20account
- https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html
- https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/samaccountname-spoofing
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008380-authentication-updates-cve-2021-42287-9dafac11-e0d0-4cb8-959a-143bd0201041
- https://github.com/WazeHell/sam-the-admin
- https://github.com/cube0x0/noPac
- https://github.com/ly4k/Pachine
- https://cloudbrothers.info/en/exploit-kerberos-samaccountname-spoofing/
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098 # account manipulation
- attack.t1136 # user creation
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068 # exploitation for privilege escalation
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4741
filter:
PrivilegeList: "-" # Interesting privileges would be "SeMachineAccountPrivilege"
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- None
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 4741
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
PrivilegeList: "-"
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
PrivilegeList | eq | - |