Detection rules › Sigma
Local domain group enumeration
Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enumerate domain local groups with tools like CME (--local-groups).
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery | T1069.001 Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups, T1087.001 Account Discovery: Local Account |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4661 | A handle to an object was requested. |
Rule body yaml
title: Local domain group enumeration
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enumerate domain local groups with tools like CME (--local-groups).
correlation: correlate TargetLogonId from ID 4624 with SubjectLogonId from ID 4661 to identify the source of the enumeration.
requirements: extended rights auditing enabled (https://www.manageengine.com/products/active-directory-audit/active-directory-auditing-configuration-guide-configure-object-level-auditing-manually.html)
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1069-Permission%20Groups%20Discovery
- https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets/page/crackmapexec
- https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/extended-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1069.001
- attack.t1087.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4661
ProcessName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
ObjectServer: 'Security Account Manager'
ObjectType: SAM_ALIAS
ObjectName|startswith:
- S-1-5-32- # refers to builtin domain local groups
- S-1-5-21- # refers to others domain local groups
filter:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection and not filter | count(Computer) by IpAddress > 30
timeframe: 15m
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filter | count(Computer) by IpAddress > 30Stage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 4661
ProcessName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
ObjectServer: 'Security Account Manager'
ObjectType: SAM_ALIAS
ObjectName|startswith:
- S-1-5-32-
- S-1-5-21-
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
SubjectUserName | ends_with | $ |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
ObjectName | starts_with |
|
ObjectServer | eq |
|
ObjectType | eq |
|
ProcessName | ends_with |
|