Domain password policy enumeration

Status: experimental
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, service security
Author: mdecrevoisier
Source: github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules

Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enumerate the domain password policy with native commands or tools like CME (--pass-pol).

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Discovery	`T1201` Password Policy Discovery

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4661	A handle to an object was requested.

Rule body yaml

title: Domain password policy enumeration
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enumerate the domain password policy with native commands or tools like CME (--pass-pol).
correlation: correlate TargetLogonId from ID 4624 with SubjectLogonId from ID 4661 to identify the source of the enumeration.
requirements: extended rights auditing enabled (https://www.manageengine.com/products/active-directory-audit/active-directory-auditing-configuration-guide-configure-object-level-auditing-manually.html)
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1201-Password%20Policy%20Discovery
- https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets/page/crackmapexec
- https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/
- https://github.com/PSGumshoe/PSGumshoe/blob/master/DirectoryService/PrivateFunctions.ps1
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1201
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4661
    ProcessName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    ObjectServer: 'Security Account Manager'
    ObjectName|startswith: DC=
    ObjectType: SAM_DOMAIN
    Properties|contains|all:
      - 'c7407360-20bf-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529' # Domain-Password property set
      - 'bf9679a4-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # lockOutObservationWindow
      - 'bf9679a5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Lockout-Duration
      - 'bf9679a6-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # lockoutThreshold
      - 'bf9679bb-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Max-Pwd-Age attribute
      - 'bf9679c2-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Min-Pwd-Age
      - 'bf9679c3-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Min-Pwd-Length
      - 'bf967a09-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Pwd-History-Length
      - 'bf967a0b-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Pwd-Properties
      - 'bf967977-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Force-Logoff
  filter:
    SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection and not filter

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
  EventID: 4661
  ProcessName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
  ObjectServer: 'Security Account Manager'
  ObjectName|startswith: DC=
  ObjectType: SAM_DOMAIN
  Properties|contains|all:
    - 'c7407360-20bf-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529'
    - 'bf9679a4-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
    - 'bf9679a5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
    - 'bf9679a6-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
    - 'bf9679bb-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
    - 'bf9679c2-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
    - 'bf9679c3-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
    - 'bf967a09-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
    - 'bf967a0b-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
    - 'bf967977-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'

Stage 2: `not filter`

filter:
  SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`SubjectUserName`	ends_with	`$`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ObjectName`	starts_with	`DC=` corpus 2 (sigma 2)
`ObjectServer`	eq	`Security Account Manager` corpus 7 (sigma 7)
`ObjectType`	eq	`SAM_DOMAIN` corpus 3 (sigma 3)
`ProcessName`	ends_with	`\lsass.exe` corpus 7 (sigma 7)
`Properties`	match	`bf967977-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2` `bf9679a4-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2` `bf9679a5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2` `bf9679a6-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2` `bf9679bb-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2` `bf9679c2-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2` `bf9679c3-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2` `bf967a09-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2` `bf967a0b-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2` `c7407360-20bf-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Domain password policy enumeration

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Stage 2: `not filter`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Domain password policy enumeration

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection

Stage 2: not filter

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Stage 2: `not filter`