Detection rules › Sigma
Replication privileges accessed to perform DCSync attack
Detects scenarios where an attacker use DCSync or SecretDump tool to exfiltrate Active Directory credentials
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4662 | An operation was performed on an object. |
Rule body yaml
title: Replication privileges accessed to perform DCSync attack
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker use DCSync or SecretDump tool to exfiltrate Active Directory credentials
requirements: extended rights auditing enabled (https://www.manageengine.com/products/active-directory-audit/active-directory-auditing-configuration-guide-configure-object-level-auditing-manually.html)
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/dump-password-hashes-from-domain-controller-with-dcsync
- https://attack.stealthbits.com/privilege-escalation-using-mimikatz-dcsync
- https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/
- https://simondotsh.com/infosec/2022/07/11/dirsync.html
- https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/compromises-in-azure-ad-through-aad-connect/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2024/06/10/icedid-brings-screenconnect-and-csharp-streamer-to-alphv-ransomware-deployment/
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.006
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
AccessMask: 0x100
Properties|contains:
- 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 # DS-Replication-Get-Changes
- 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 # DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
- 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c # DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set
filter:
SubjectUserName|endswith: $
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- SharePoint accounts (FIM usage)
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 4662
AccessMask: 0x100
Properties|contains:
- 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
- 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
- 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
SubjectUserName|endswith: $
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
SubjectUserName | ends_with | $ |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
AccessMask | eq |
|
Properties | match |
|