WMI module loaded by suspicious process

title: WMI module loaded by suspicious process
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to load WMI modules from a suspicious process (like PowerShell).
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0002-Execution/T1047-Windows%20Management%20Instrumentation
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190811201010.html
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
- https://posts.specterops.io/real-time-sysmon-processing-via-ksql-and-helk-part-3-basic-use-case-8fbf383cb54f
- https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/master/signatures/sigma/sysmon_wmi_module_load.yml
- https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/10/14/basics-of-tracking-wmi-activity
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
author: shortly adapted from Roberto Rodriguez rule
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: image_loaded
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 7 # image loaded
    ImageLoaded|endswith:
      - '\wmiclnt.dll'
      - '\WmiApRpl.dll'
      - '\wmiprov.dll'
      - '\wmiutils.dll'
      - '\wbemcomn.dll'
      - '\WMINet_Utils.dll'
      - '\wbemsvc.dll'
      - '\fastprox.dll'
      - '\wmi*'
  filter:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\wmiprvse.exe'
      - '\wmiapsrv.exe'
      - '\svchost.exe'
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- None
level: high