Detection rules › Sigma
Impacket WMIexec process execution
Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to execute WMIexec in order to escalate privileges.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
Rule body yaml
title: Impacket WMIexec process execution
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to execute WMIexec in order to escalate privileges.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0002-Execution/T1047-Windows%20Management%20Instrumentation
- https://riccardoancarani.github.io/2020-05-10-hunting-for-impacket/#wmiexecpy
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/attack-detection-fundamentals-discovery-and-lateral-movement-lab-5
- https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/wmiexec.py
- https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/10/14/basics-of-tracking-wmi-activity
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-detect-and-prevent-impackets-wmiexec/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
- https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/09/unwrapping-ursnifs-gifts/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2024/06/10/icedid-brings-screenconnect-and-csharp-streamer-to-alphv-ransomware-deployment
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/us-china-espionage
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047 # Windows Management Instrumentation
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_baseline: #full command "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c echo cd ^> \\127.0.0.1\C$\__output 2^>^&1 > C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat & C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat & del C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat"
Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
selection_parent:
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- '\\127.0.0.1\'
- '/Q'
- '/C'
selection_process: # full command: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat"
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\\127.0.0.1\'
- '/Q'
- '/C'
condition: selection_baseline and (selection_parent or selection_process)
falsepositives:
- None
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection_baseline and (selection_parent or selection_process)Stage 1: selection_baseline
selection_baseline:
Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
Stage 2: selection_parent
selection_parent:
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- '\\127.0.0.1\'
- '/Q'
- '/C'
Stage 3: selection_process
selection_process:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\\127.0.0.1\'
- '/Q'
- '/C'
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
|
Image | ends_with |
|
ParentCommandLine | match |
|