Detection rules › Sigma
Impacket WMIexec execution via SMB admin share
Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to remotely execute WMIexec via SMB admin share in order to escalate privileges.
Known false positives
- None
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
title: Impacket WMIexec execution via SMB admin share
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to remotely execute WMIexec via SMB admin share in order to escalate privileges.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.002%20-SMB%20Windows%20Admin%20Shares
- https://riccardoancarani.github.io/2020-05-10-hunting-for-impacket/#wmiexecpy
- https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/10/14/basics-of-tracking-wmi-activity
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-detect-and-prevent-impackets-wmiexec/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5145
ShareName: '\\*\ADMIN$'
RelativeTargetName|re: '__\d*\.\d*' # example: '__1619091076.1269338'. Can be changed in source code
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 5145
ShareName: '\\*\ADMIN$'
RelativeTargetName|re: '__\d*\.\d*'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
RelativeTargetName | regex_match |
| field:"RelativeTargetName" kind:regex_match value:"__\d*.\d*" |
ShareName | wildcard |
| field:"ShareName" kind:wildcard value:"\\*\ADMIN$" |