Detection rules › Sigma

Credentials (protected by DPAPI) dump via network share

Status
experimental
Severity
high
Log source
product windows, service security
Author
mdecrevoisier
Source
github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules

Detects scenarios where an attacker attempt to dump DPAPI credentials (Windows Vault, Chrome, RDP, WiFi, Emails, ...) or registry hives via network share via tools like DonPAPI.

Known false positives

  • None

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

title: Credentials (protected by DPAPI) dump via network share
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempt to dump DPAPI credentials (Windows Vault, Chrome, RDP, WiFi, Emails, ...) or registry hives via network share via tools like DonPAPI.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/EVTX_full_APT_attack_steps
- https://github.com/login-securite/DonPAPI
- https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2019/talks/HIP2019-Paula_Januszkiewicz-Dpapi_And_Dpapi_Ng_Decrypting_All_Users_Secrets_And_Pfx_Passwords.pdf
- https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/credentials/dumping/dpapi-protected-secrets
- https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/privilege-escalation/mimikatz
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1555.004
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\*\C$'
    RelativeTargetName|contains:
    # WIFI
    - '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Wlansvc\Profiles\Interfaces\'
    # Registry hives (security, system, sofware)
    - '\Windows\System32\config\SECURITY'
    - '\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE'
    - '\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM'
    # Vault
    - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\'
    - '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Vault\'
    - '\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\'
    # Credentials
    - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\'
    - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\'
    - '\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\'
    # DPAPI keys
    - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\'
    - '\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Protect\'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
  EventID: 5145
  ShareName: '\\*\C$'
  RelativeTargetName|contains:
  - '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Wlansvc\Profiles\Interfaces\'
  - '\Windows\System32\config\SECURITY'
  - '\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE'
  - '\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM'
  - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\'
  - '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Vault\'
  - '\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\'
  - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\'
  - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\'
  - '\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\'
  - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\'
  - '\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Protect\'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
RelativeTargetNamematch
  • \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
  • \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\
  • \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
  • \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\
  • \ProgramData\Microsoft\Vault\
  • \ProgramData\Microsoft\Wlansvc\Profiles\Interfaces\
  • \Windows\System32\Microsoft\Protect\
  • \Windows\System32\config\SECURITY
  • \Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE
  • \Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM
  • \Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
  • \Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\
field:"RelativeTargetName" kind:match
ShareNamewildcard
  • \\*\C$ corpus 7 (sigma 7)
field:"ShareName" kind:wildcard value:"\\*\C$"