Stickey key called CMD via command execution (hash detection)

Status: experimental
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, category process_creation
Author: mdecrevoisier
Source: github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules

Detects scenarios where an attacker calls the stickey key and execute CMD.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1546.008` Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation

Rule body yaml

title: Stickey key called CMD via command execution (hash detection)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker calls the stickey key and execute CMD.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0004-Privilege%20Escalation/T1546-Image%20File%20Execution%20Options%20Injection
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt29-domain-frontin
- https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ClearSky-Fox-Kitten-Campaign-v1.pdf
requirements: have an up to date inventory for CMD hashes of your environment
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1546.008
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 1
    ParentImage|endswith: \winlogon.exe
    Hashes|contains: # SHA1 hash of CMD.exe
    - 99AE9C73E9BEE6F9C76D6F4093A9882DF06832CF # Windows 10 x64 v10.0.14393.0
    - 8C5437CD76A89EC983E3B364E219944DA3DAB464 # Windows 10 x64 v10.0.17763.0
    - 8DCA9749CD48D286950E7A9FA1088C937CBCCAD4 # Windows 10 x64 v10.0.18363.0
    - F1EFB0FDDC156E4C61C5F78A54700E4E7984D55D # Windows 10 x64 v10.0.18363.0
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
  EventID: 1
  ParentImage|endswith: \winlogon.exe
  Hashes|contains:
  - 99AE9C73E9BEE6F9C76D6F4093A9882DF06832CF
  - 8C5437CD76A89EC983E3B364E219944DA3DAB464
  - 8DCA9749CD48D286950E7A9FA1088C937CBCCAD4
  - F1EFB0FDDC156E4C61C5F78A54700E4E7984D55D

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Hashes`	match	`8C5437CD76A89EC983E3B364E219944DA3DAB464` `8DCA9749CD48D286950E7A9FA1088C937CBCCAD4` `99AE9C73E9BEE6F9C76D6F4093A9882DF06832CF` `F1EFB0FDDC156E4C61C5F78A54700E4E7984D55D`
`ParentImage`	ends_with	`\winlogon.exe` corpus 5 (sigma 5)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Stickey key called CMD via command execution (hash detection)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Stickey key called CMD via command execution (hash detection)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`