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Detection rules › Sigma

Sticky key sethc command for replacement by CMD

Status
experimental
Severity
high
Log source
category process_creation, product windows
Author
mdecrevoisier
Source
github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules

Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to replace the original sethc.exe file by cmd.exe.

Known false positives

  • None

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Privilege Escalation

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688: A new process has been created.

Rule body

title: Sticky key sethc command for replacement by CMD
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to replace the original sethc.exe file by cmd.exe.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0004-Privilege%20Escalation/T1546-Image%20File%20Execution%20Options%20Injection
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt29-domain-frontin
- https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ClearSky-Fox-Kitten-Campaign-v1.pdf
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1546.008
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4688
    CommandLine|contains|all: # full command 'copy /y C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe C:\windows\system32\sethc.exe'
      - copy
      - cmd.exe
      - sethc.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
  EventID: 4688
  CommandLine|contains|all:
    - copy
    - cmd.exe
    - sethc.exe

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • cmd.exe corpus 4 (sigma 3, splunk 1)
  • copy corpus 5 (sigma 4, chronicle 1)
  • sethc.exe corpus 4 (sigma 4)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match