LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, service windefend
Author: Markus Neis
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects Access to LSASS Process

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1003.001` OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Event coverage

Provider	Event
Windows-Defender	Event ID 1121

Rule body yaml

title: LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction
id: a0a278fe-2c0e-4de2-ac3c-c68b08a9ba98
status: test
description: Detects Access to LSASS Process
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018-08-26
modified: 2022-08-13
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
    definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1121
        Path|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    filter_thor:
        ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\thor64.exe'
            - '\thor.exe'
    filter_exact:
        ProcessName:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\atiesrxx.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\nvwmi64.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
    filter_begins:
        ProcessName|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\'
            - 'C:\WINDOWS\Installer\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Google Chrome GoogleUpdate.exe
    - Some Taskmgr.exe related activity
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection and not 1 of filter_*

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
    EventID: 1121
    Path|endswith: '\lsass.exe'

Stage 2: `not filter_*`

filter_thor:
    ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
    ProcessName|endswith:
        - '\thor64.exe'
        - '\thor.exe'
filter_exact:
    ProcessName:
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\atiesrxx.exe'
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe'
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\nvwmi64.exe'
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe'
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
        - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
filter_begins:
    ProcessName|startswith:
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\'
        - 'C:\WINDOWS\Installer\'
        - 'C:\Program Files\'
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`ProcessName`	ends_with	`\thor.exe`
`ProcessName`	ends_with	`\thor64.exe`
`ProcessName`	starts_with	`C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\`
`ProcessName`	eq	`C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe`
`ProcessName`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe`
`ProcessName`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe`
`ProcessName`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\atiesrxx.exe`
`ProcessName`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe`
`ProcessName`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\nvwmi64.exe`
`ProcessName`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe`
`ProcessName`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe`
`ProcessName`	starts_with	`C:\Program Files (x86)\`
`ProcessName`	starts_with	`C:\Program Files\`
`ProcessName`	starts_with	`C:\WINDOWS\Installer\`
`ProcessName`	starts_with	`C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Path`	ends_with	`\lsass.exe`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Stage 2: `not filter_*`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection

Stage 2: not filter_*

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Stage 2: `not filter_*`