Potential Active Directory Reconnaissance/Enumeration Via LDAP

Status: test
Severity: medium
Log source: product windows, service ldap
Author: Adeem Mawani
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects potential Active Directory enumeration via LDAP

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Discovery	`T1069.002` Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups, `T1087.002` Account Discovery: Domain Account, `T1482` Domain Trust Discovery

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
LDAP-Client	Event ID 30	LDAP search request

Rule body yaml

title: Potential Active Directory Reconnaissance/Enumeration Via LDAP
id: 31d68132-4038-47c7-8f8e-635a39a7c174
status: test
description: Detects potential Active Directory enumeration via LDAP
references:
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/hunting-for-reconnaissance-activities-using-ldap-search-filters/ba-p/824726
    - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Recon/PowerView.ps1
    - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3/blob/7d96b991b1887ff50349ce59c80980bc0d95c86a/SharpHound3/LdapBuilder.cs
    - https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-detecting-active-directory-data-collection-0xff21-c22d1a57494c
    - https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py/blob/d65eb614831cd30f26028ccb072f5e77ca287e0b/bloodhound/ad/domain.py#L427
    - https://ipurple.team/2024/07/15/sharphound-detection/
author: Adeem Mawani
date: 2021-06-22
modified: 2025-07-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: ldap
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-LDAP-Client/Debug ETW logging'
detection:
    generic_search:
        EventID: 30
        SearchFilter|contains:
            - '(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483648)'
            - '(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483656)'
            - '(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483652)'
            - '(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483650)'
            - '(sAMAccountType=805306369)'
            - '(sAMAccountType=805306368)'
            - '(sAMAccountType=536870913)'
            - '(sAMAccountType=536870912)'
            - '(sAMAccountType=268435457)'
            - '(sAMAccountType=268435456)'
            - '(objectCategory=groupPolicyContainer)'
            - '(objectCategory=organizationalUnit)'
            # - '(objectCategory=Computer)' Prone to false positives
            - '(objectCategory=nTDSDSA)'
            - '(objectCategory=server)'
            - '(objectCategory=domain)'
            - '(objectCategory=person)'
            - '(objectCategory=group)'
            - '(objectCategory=user)'
            - '(objectClass=trustedDomain)'
            - '(objectClass=computer)'
            - '(objectClass=server)'
            - '(objectClass=group)'
            - '(objectClass=user)'
            - '(primaryGroupID=521)'
            - '(primaryGroupID=516)'
            - '(primaryGroupID=515)'
            - '(primaryGroupID=512)'
            - 'Domain Admins'
            - 'objectGUID=\*'
            - '(schemaIDGUID=\*)'
            - 'admincount=1'
    distinguished_name_enumeration:
        EventID: 30
        SearchFilter: '(objectclass=\*)'
        DistinguishedName|contains:
            - 'CN=Domain Admins'
            - 'CN=Enterprise Admins'
            - 'CN=Group Policy Creator Owners'
    suspicious_flag:
        EventID: 30
        SearchFilter|contains:
            - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304)'
            - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2097152)'
            - '!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=1048574)'
            - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)'
            - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=65536)'
            - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=8192)'
            - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=544)'
            - '!(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)'
            - 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
            - 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
            - 'msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount'
            - '(accountExpires=9223372036854775807)'
            - '(accountExpires=0)'
            - '(adminCount=1)'
            - 'ms-MCS-AdmPwd'
    narrow_down_filter:
        EventID: 30
        SearchFilter|contains:
            - '(domainSid=*)'
            - '(objectSid=*)'
    condition: (generic_search and not narrow_down_filter) or suspicious_flag or distinguished_name_enumeration
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

(generic_search and not narrow_down_filter) or suspicious_flag or distinguished_name_enumeration

Stage 1: `generic_search`

generic_search:
    EventID: 30
    SearchFilter|contains:
        - '(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483648)'
        - '(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483656)'
        - '(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483652)'
        - '(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483650)'
        - '(sAMAccountType=805306369)'
        - '(sAMAccountType=805306368)'
        - '(sAMAccountType=536870913)'
        - '(sAMAccountType=536870912)'
        - '(sAMAccountType=268435457)'
        - '(sAMAccountType=268435456)'
        - '(objectCategory=groupPolicyContainer)'
        - '(objectCategory=organizationalUnit)'
        - '(objectCategory=nTDSDSA)'
        - '(objectCategory=server)'
        - '(objectCategory=domain)'
        - '(objectCategory=person)'
        - '(objectCategory=group)'
        - '(objectCategory=user)'
        - '(objectClass=trustedDomain)'
        - '(objectClass=computer)'
        - '(objectClass=server)'
        - '(objectClass=group)'
        - '(objectClass=user)'
        - '(primaryGroupID=521)'
        - '(primaryGroupID=516)'
        - '(primaryGroupID=515)'
        - '(primaryGroupID=512)'
        - 'Domain Admins'
        - 'objectGUID=\*'
        - '(schemaIDGUID=\*)'
        - 'admincount=1'

Stage 2: `not narrow_down_filter`

narrow_down_filter:
    EventID: 30
    SearchFilter|contains:
        - '(domainSid=*)'
        - '(objectSid=*)'

Stage 3: `suspicious_flag`

suspicious_flag:
    EventID: 30
    SearchFilter|contains:
        - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304)'
        - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2097152)'
        - '!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=1048574)'
        - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)'
        - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=65536)'
        - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=8192)'
        - '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=544)'
        - '!(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)'
        - 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
        - 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
        - 'msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount'
        - '(accountExpires=9223372036854775807)'
        - '(accountExpires=0)'
        - '(adminCount=1)'
        - 'ms-MCS-AdmPwd'

Stage 4: `distinguished_name_enumeration`

distinguished_name_enumeration:
    EventID: 30
    SearchFilter: '(objectclass=\*)'
    DistinguishedName|contains:
        - 'CN=Domain Admins'
        - 'CN=Enterprise Admins'
        - 'CN=Group Policy Creator Owners'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`SearchFilter`	match	`(domainSid=*)`
`SearchFilter`	match	`(objectSid=*)`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`DistinguishedName`	match	`CN=Domain Admins` `CN=Enterprise Admins` `CN=Group Policy Creator Owners`
`SearchFilter`	eq	`(objectclass=\*)`
`SearchFilter`	match	`!(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)` `!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=1048574)` `(accountExpires=0)` `(accountExpires=9223372036854775807)` `(adminCount=1)` `(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483648)` `(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483650)` `(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483652)` `(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483656)` `(objectCategory=domain)` `(objectCategory=group)` `(objectCategory=groupPolicyContainer)` `(objectCategory=nTDSDSA)` `(objectCategory=organizationalUnit)` `(objectCategory=person)` `(objectCategory=server)` `(objectCategory=user)` `(objectClass=computer)` `(objectClass=group)` `(objectClass=server)` `(objectClass=trustedDomain)` `(objectClass=user)` `(primaryGroupID=512)` `(primaryGroupID=515)` `(primaryGroupID=516)` `(primaryGroupID=521)` `(sAMAccountType=268435456)` `(sAMAccountType=268435457)` `(sAMAccountType=536870912)` `(sAMAccountType=536870913)` `(sAMAccountType=805306368)` `(sAMAccountType=805306369)` `(schemaIDGUID=\)` `(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2097152)` `(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304)` `(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)` `(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=544)` `(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=65536)` `(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=8192)` `Domain Admins` `admincount=1` `ms-MCS-AdmPwd` `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo` `msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount` `objectGUID=\`

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`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Potential Active Directory Reconnaissance/Enumeration Via LDAP

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `generic_search`

Stage 2: `not narrow_down_filter`

Stage 3: `suspicious_flag`

Stage 4: `distinguished_name_enumeration`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Potential Active Directory Reconnaissance/Enumeration Via LDAP

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: generic_search

Stage 2: not narrow_down_filter

Stage 3: suspicious_flag

Stage 4: distinguished_name_enumeration

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `generic_search`

Stage 2: `not narrow_down_filter`

Stage 3: `suspicious_flag`

Stage 4: `distinguished_name_enumeration`