Active Directory User Backdoors

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, service security
Author: @neu5ron
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation
Privilege Escalation	`T1098` Account Manipulation

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4738	A user account was changed.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5136	A directory service object was modified.

Rule body yaml

title: Active Directory User Backdoors
id: 300bac00-e041-4ee2-9c36-e262656a6ecc
status: test
description: Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.
references:
    - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc220234.aspx
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2017-04-13
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account Management, DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\DS Access\Audit Directory Service Changes'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 4738
    filter_empty:
        AllowedToDelegateTo:
            - ''
            - '-'
    filter_null:
        AllowedToDelegateTo: null
    selection_5136_1:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
    selection_5136_2:
        EventID: 5136
        ObjectClass: 'user'
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'servicePrincipalName'
    selection_5136_3:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
    condition: (selection1 and not 1 of filter_*) or 1 of selection_5136_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

(selection1 and not 1 of filter_*) or 1 of selection_5136_*

Stage 1: `selection1`

selection1:
    EventID: 4738

Stage 2: `not filter_*`

filter_empty:
    AllowedToDelegateTo:
        - ''
        - '-'
filter_null:
    AllowedToDelegateTo: null

Stage 3: `selection_5136_1`

selection_5136_1:
    EventID: 5136
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'

Stage 4: `selection_5136_2`

selection_5136_2:
    EventID: 5136
    ObjectClass: 'user'
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'servicePrincipalName'

Stage 5: `selection_5136_3`

selection_5136_3:
    EventID: 5136
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`AllowedToDelegateTo`	eq	`-`
`AllowedToDelegateTo`	is_null	(no value, null check)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`AttributeLDAPDisplayName`	eq	`msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` corpus 3 (sigma 2, kusto 1) `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo` `servicePrincipalName` corpus 9 (sigma 4, splunk 3, elastic 1, kusto 1)
`ObjectClass`	eq	`user` corpus 6 (sigma 2, splunk 2, elastic 1, kusto 1)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Active Directory User Backdoors

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection1`

Stage 2: `not filter_*`

Stage 3: `selection_5136_1`

Stage 4: `selection_5136_2`

Stage 5: `selection_5136_3`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Active Directory User Backdoors

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection1

Stage 2: not filter_*

Stage 3: selection_5136_1

Stage 4: selection_5136_2

Stage 5: selection_5136_3

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection1`

Stage 2: `not filter_*`

Stage 3: `selection_5136_1`

Stage 4: `selection_5136_2`

Stage 5: `selection_5136_3`