Detection rules › Sigma
DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe
Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.
Known false positives
- Domain Controllers acting as printer servers too? :)
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
title: DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe
id: 214e8f95-100a-4e04-bb31-ef6cba8ce07e
status: test
description: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.
references:
- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
- https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/
- https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608
author: OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2018-11-28
modified: 2022-08-11
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5145
ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
RelativeTargetName: spoolss
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- 'Domain Controllers acting as printer servers too? :)'
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 5145
ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$'
RelativeTargetName: spoolss
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
RelativeTargetName | eq |
| field:"RelativeTargetName" kind:eq value:"spoolss" |
ShareName | eq |
| field:"ShareName" kind:eq value:"\\\\\*\\IPC$" |