First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product windows, service security
Author: Samir Bousseaden
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Lateral Movement	`T1021.002` Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5145	A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.

Rule body yaml

title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe
id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
status: test
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2023-03-14
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
    false_positives:
        RelativeTargetName:
            - 'atsvc'
            - 'samr'
            - 'lsarpc'
            - 'lsass'
            - 'winreg'
            - 'netlogon'
            - 'srvsvc'
            - 'protected_storage'
            - 'wkssvc'
            - 'browser'
            - 'netdfs'
            - 'svcctl'
            - 'spoolss'
            - 'ntsvcs'
            - 'LSM_API_service'
            - 'HydraLsPipe'
            - 'TermSrv_API_service'
            - 'MsFteWds'
            - 'sql\query'
            - 'eventlog'
    condition: selection1 and not false_positives
falsepositives:
    - Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection1 and not false_positives

Stage 1: `selection1`

selection1:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$'

Stage 2: `not false_positives`

false_positives:
    RelativeTargetName:
        - 'atsvc'
        - 'samr'
        - 'lsarpc'
        - 'lsass'
        - 'winreg'
        - 'netlogon'
        - 'srvsvc'
        - 'protected_storage'
        - 'wkssvc'
        - 'browser'
        - 'netdfs'
        - 'svcctl'
        - 'spoolss'
        - 'ntsvcs'
        - 'LSM_API_service'
        - 'HydraLsPipe'
        - 'TermSrv_API_service'
        - 'MsFteWds'
        - 'sql\query'
        - 'eventlog'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`HydraLsPipe`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`LSM_API_service`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`MsFteWds`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`TermSrv_API_service`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`atsvc`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`browser`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`eventlog`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`lsarpc`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`lsass`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`netdfs`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`netlogon`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`ntsvcs`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`protected_storage`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`samr`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`spoolss`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`sql\query`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`srvsvc`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`svcctl`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`winreg`
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`wkssvc`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ShareName`	eq	`\\\\\*\\IPC$` corpus 7 (sigma 7)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection1`

Stage 2: `not false_positives`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection1

Stage 2: not false_positives

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection1`

Stage 2: `not false_positives`