Detection rules › Sigma

Possible PetitPotam Coerce Authentication Attempt

Status
test
Severity
high
Log source
product windows, service security
Author
Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detect PetitPotam coerced authentication activity.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential AccessT1187 Forced Authentication

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

title: Possible PetitPotam Coerce Authentication Attempt
id: 1ce8c8a3-2723-48ed-8246-906ac91061a6
status: test
description: Detect PetitPotam coerced authentication activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
    - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/0dd6de32de2118b2818550df9e65255f4109a56d/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml
author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag
date: 2021-09-02
modified: 2022-08-11
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName|startswith: '\\\\' # looking for the string \\somethink\IPC$
        ShareName|endswith: '\IPC$'
        RelativeTargetName: lsarpc
        SubjectUserName: ANONYMOUS LOGON
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown. Feedback welcomed.
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName|startswith: '\\\\'
    ShareName|endswith: '\IPC$'
    RelativeTargetName: lsarpc
    SubjectUserName: ANONYMOUS LOGON

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
RelativeTargetNameeq
  • lsarpc corpus 3 (sigma 2, splunk 1)
ShareNameends_with
  • \IPC$
ShareNamestarts_with
  • \\\\
SubjectUserNameeq
  • ANONYMOUS LOGON corpus 3 (splunk 2, sigma 1)