Detection rules › Sigma

File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive Data

Status
experimental
Severity
medium
Log source
product windows, service security
Author
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects access to Signal Desktop's sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json. The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop stores all locally saved messages in an encrypted SQLite database, while the config.json contains the decryption key needed to access that data. Since the key is stored in plain text, a threat actor who gains access to both files can decrypt and read sensitive messages without needing the users credentials. Currently the rule only covers the default Signal installation path in AppData\Roaming. Signal Portable installations may use different paths based on user configuration. Additional paths can be added to the selection as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential AccessT1003 OS Credential Dumping

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

title: File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive Data
id: 5d6c375a-18ae-4952-b4f6-8b803f6c8555
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects access to Signal Desktop's sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json.
    The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop stores all locally saved messages in an encrypted SQLite database, while the config.json contains the decryption key needed to access that data.
    Since the key is stored in plain text, a threat actor who gains access to both files can decrypt and read sensitive messages without needing the users credentials.
    Currently the rule only covers the default Signal installation path in AppData\Roaming. Signal Portable installations may use different paths based on user configuration. Additional paths can be added to the selection as needed.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger/
    - https://vmois.dev/query-signal-desktop-messages-sqlite/
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: System Access Control List (SACL) policy with attributes List folder/read data on Objects'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectType: 'File'
        ObjectName|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Signal\'
        ObjectName|endswith:
            - '\config.json'
            - '\db.sqlite'
    filter_main_signal:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\signal-portable.exe'
            - '\signal.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, but possible from AV or backup software accessing the files.
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    EventID: 4663
    ObjectType: 'File'
    ObjectName|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Signal\'
    ObjectName|endswith:
        - '\config.json'
        - '\db.sqlite'

Stage 2: not filter_main_signal

filter_main_signal:
    ProcessName|endswith:
        - '\signal-portable.exe'
        - '\signal.exe'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

FieldKindExcluded values
ProcessNameends_with\signal-portable.exe
ProcessNameends_with\signal.exe

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
ObjectNameends_with
  • \config.json
  • \db.sqlite
ObjectNamematch
  • \AppData\Roaming\Signal\
ObjectTypeeq
  • File corpus 10 (sigma 8, splunk 2)