Detection rules › Sigma

Potentially Suspicious AccessMask Requested From LSASS

Status
test
Severity
medium
Log source
product windows, service security
Author
Roberto Rodriguez, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community (update)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential AccessT1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

title: Potentially Suspicious AccessMask Requested From LSASS
id: 4a1b6da0-d94f-4fc3-98fc-2d9cb9e5ee76
status: test
description: Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Roberto Rodriguez, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community (update)
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2023-12-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - car.2019-04-004
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_1:
        EventID: 4656 # A handle to an object was requested.
        ObjectName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        AccessMask|contains:
            - '0x40'
            - '0x1400'
            # - '0x1000'  # minimum access requirements to query basic info from service
            - '0x100000'
            - '0x1410'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x1010'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x1438'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x143a'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x1418'    # car.2019-04-004
            - '0x1f0fff'
            - '0x1f1fff'
            - '0x1f2fff'
            - '0x1f3fff'
    selection_2:
        EventID: 4663 # An attempt was made to access an object
        ObjectName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        AccessList|contains:
            - '4484'
            - '4416'
    filter_main_specific:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\GamingServices.exe'
            - '\lsm.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
            - '\minionhost.exe'  # Cyberreason
            - '\MRT.exe'         # MS Malware Removal Tool
            - '\MsMpEng.exe'     # Defender
            - '\perfmon.exe'
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procexp64.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\taskmgr.exe'
            - '\thor.exe'        # THOR
            - '\thor64.exe'      # THOR
            - '\vmtoolsd.exe'
            - '\VsTskMgr.exe'    # McAfee Enterprise
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'
            - 'RtkAudUService64' # https://medium.com/falconforce/the-curious-case-of-realtek-and-lsass-33fc0c8482ff
        ProcessName|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - ':\Windows\SysNative\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWow64\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
    filter_main_generic:
        ProcessName|contains: ':\Program Files'  # too many false positives with legitimate AV and EDR solutions
    filter_main_exact:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe'
            - ':\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
            - ':\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe'
    filter_main_sysmon:
        ProcessName|endswith: ':\Windows\Sysmon64.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_aurora:
        ProcessName|contains: ':\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent-sc\aurora\'
        ProcessName|endswith: '\aurora-agent-64.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_scenarioengine:
        # Example: C:\a70de9569c3a5aa22184ef52a890177b\x64\SCENARIOENGINE.EXE
        ProcessName|endswith: '\x64\SCENARIOENGINE.EXE'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_avira1:
        ProcessName|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\is-'
        ProcessName|endswith: '\avira_system_speedup.tmp'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_avira2:
        ProcessName|contains: ':\Windows\Temp\'
        ProcessName|endswith: '\avira_speedup_setup_update.tmp'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_snmp:
        ProcessName|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\snmp.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_main_googleupdate:
        ProcessName|contains: ':\Windows\SystemTemp\'
        ProcessName|endswith: '\GoogleUpdate.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    filter_optional_procmon:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\procmon64.exe'
            - '\procmon.exe'
        AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason; update the whitelist with it
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Stage 1: selection_1

selection_1:
    EventID: 4656
    ObjectName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    AccessMask|contains:
        - '0x40'
        - '0x1400'
        - '0x100000'
        - '0x1410'
        - '0x1010'
        - '0x1438'
        - '0x143a'
        - '0x1418'
        - '0x1f0fff'
        - '0x1f1fff'
        - '0x1f2fff'
        - '0x1f3fff'

Stage 2: selection_2

selection_2:
    EventID: 4663
    ObjectName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    AccessList|contains:
        - '4484'
        - '4416'

Stage 3: not filter_main_*

filter_main_specific:
    ProcessName|endswith:
        - '\csrss.exe'
        - '\GamingServices.exe'
        - '\lsm.exe'
        - '\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
        - '\minionhost.exe'
        - '\MRT.exe'
        - '\MsMpEng.exe'
        - '\perfmon.exe'
        - '\procexp.exe'
        - '\procexp64.exe'
        - '\svchost.exe'
        - '\taskmgr.exe'
        - '\thor.exe'
        - '\thor64.exe'
        - '\vmtoolsd.exe'
        - '\VsTskMgr.exe'
        - '\wininit.exe'
        - '\wmiprvse.exe'
        - 'RtkAudUService64'
    ProcessName|contains:
        - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
        - ':\Program Files\'
        - ':\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
        - ':\Windows\SysNative\'
        - ':\Windows\System32\'
        - ':\Windows\SysWow64\'
        - ':\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
filter_main_generic:
    ProcessName|contains: ':\Program Files'
filter_main_exact:
    ProcessName|endswith:
        - ':\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe'
        - ':\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
        - ':\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe'
filter_main_sysmon:
    ProcessName|endswith: ':\Windows\Sysmon64.exe'
    AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
filter_main_aurora:
    ProcessName|contains: ':\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent-sc\aurora\'
    ProcessName|endswith: '\aurora-agent-64.exe'
    AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
filter_main_scenarioengine:
    ProcessName|endswith: '\x64\SCENARIOENGINE.EXE'
    AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
filter_main_avira1:
    ProcessName|contains|all:
        - ':\Users\'
        - '\AppData\Local\Temp\is-'
    ProcessName|endswith: '\avira_system_speedup.tmp'
    AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
filter_main_avira2:
    ProcessName|contains: ':\Windows\Temp\'
    ProcessName|endswith: '\avira_speedup_setup_update.tmp'
    AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
filter_main_snmp:
    ProcessName|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\snmp.exe'
    AccessList|contains: '%%4484'
filter_main_googleupdate:
    ProcessName|contains: ':\Windows\SystemTemp\'
    ProcessName|endswith: '\GoogleUpdate.exe'
    AccessList|contains: '%%4484'

Stage 4: not filter_optional_procmon

filter_optional_procmon:
    ProcessName|endswith:
        - '\procmon64.exe'
        - '\procmon.exe'
    AccessList|contains: '%%4484'

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

FieldKindExcluded values
ProcessNameends_withRtkAudUService64
ProcessNameends_with\GamingServices.exe
ProcessNameends_with\MRT.exe
ProcessNameends_with\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe
ProcessNameends_with\MsMpEng.exe
ProcessNameends_with\VsTskMgr.exe
ProcessNameends_with\csrss.exe
ProcessNameends_with\lsm.exe
ProcessNameends_with\minionhost.exe
ProcessNameends_with\perfmon.exe
ProcessNameends_with\procexp.exe
ProcessNameends_with\procexp64.exe
ProcessNameends_with\svchost.exe
ProcessNameends_with\taskmgr.exe
ProcessNameends_with\thor.exe
ProcessNameends_with\thor64.exe
ProcessNameends_with\vmtoolsd.exe
ProcessNameends_with\wininit.exe
ProcessNameends_with\wmiprvse.exe
ProcessNamematch:\Program Files (x86)\
ProcessNamematch:\Program Files\
ProcessNamematch:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\
ProcessNamematch:\Windows\SysNative\
ProcessNamematch:\Windows\SysWow64\
ProcessNamematch:\Windows\System32\
ProcessNamematch:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\
AccessListmatch%%4484
ProcessNameends_with:\Windows\Sysmon64.exe
AccessListmatch%%4484
ProcessNameends_with:\Windows\System32\snmp.exe
AccessListmatch%%4484
ProcessNameends_with\GoogleUpdate.exe
ProcessNamematch:\Windows\SystemTemp\
AccessListmatch%%4484
ProcessNameends_with\aurora-agent-64.exe
ProcessNamematch:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent-sc\aurora\
AccessListmatch%%4484
ProcessNameends_with\avira_speedup_setup_update.tmp
ProcessNamematch:\Windows\Temp\
AccessListmatch%%4484
ProcessNameends_with\avira_system_speedup.tmp
ProcessNamematch:\Users\
ProcessNamematch\AppData\Local\Temp\is-
AccessListmatch%%4484
ProcessNameends_with\x64\SCENARIOENGINE.EXE
ProcessNameends_with:\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe
ProcessNameends_with:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe
ProcessNameends_with:\Windows\System32\taskhostw.exe
ProcessNamematch:\Program Files
ProcessNameends_with\procmon.exe
ProcessNameends_with\procmon64.exe
AccessListmatch%%4484

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
AccessListmatch
  • 4416
  • 4484
AccessMaskmatch
  • 0x100000
  • 0x1010
  • 0x1400
  • 0x1410
  • 0x1418
  • 0x1438
  • 0x143a
  • 0x1f0fff
  • 0x1f1fff
  • 0x1f2fff
  • 0x1f3fff
  • 0x40
ObjectNameends_with
  • \lsass.exe corpus 4 (sigma 4)