Detection rules › Sigma
User Added to Local Administrator Group
Detects the addition of a new member to the local administrator group, which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Persistence | T1078 Valid Accounts, T1098 Account Manipulation |
| Privilege Escalation | T1078 Valid Accounts, T1098 Account Manipulation |
| Stealth | T1078 Valid Accounts |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4732 | A member was added to a security-enabled local group. |
Rule body yaml
title: User Added to Local Administrator Group
id: c265cf08-3f99-46c1-8d59-328247057d57
status: stable
description: Detects the addition of a new member to the local administrator group, which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-14
modified: 2021-01-17
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_eid:
EventID: 4732
selection_group:
- TargetUserName|startswith: 'Administr'
- TargetSid: 'S-1-5-32-544'
filter_main_computer_accounts:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*Stage 1: selection_eid
selection_eid:
EventID: 4732
Stage 2: selection_group
selection_group:
- TargetUserName|startswith: 'Administr'
- TargetSid: 'S-1-5-32-544'
Stage 3: not filter_main_computer_accounts
filter_main_computer_accounts:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
SubjectUserName | ends_with | $ |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
TargetSid | eq |
|
TargetUserName | starts_with |
|