Detection rules › Sigma
Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege
Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver. With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode. This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers. If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers. This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.
Known false positives
- Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used products and allowed tools. A good thing to do is to try and exclude users who are allowed to load drivers.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4673: A privileged service was called. |
Rule body
title: Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege
id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612
status: test
description: |
Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver.
With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode.
This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers.
If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers.
This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_1:
EventID: 4673
PrivilegeList: 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege'
Service: '-'
filter_main_exact:
ProcessName:
- 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe'
filter_optional_others:
ProcessName|endswith:
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
- '\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
- '\procexp.exe'
- '\procexp64.exe'
- '\procexp64a.exe'
- '\procmon.exe'
- '\procmon64.exe'
- '\procmon64a.exe'
filter_main_startswith:
ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft'
filter_optional_dropbox:
ProcessName|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\'
ProcessName|endswith: '\Dropbox.exe'
condition: selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used products and allowed tools. A good thing to do is to try and exclude users who are allowed to load drivers.
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection_1
selection_1:
EventID: 4673
PrivilegeList: 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege'
Service: '-'
Stage 2: not filter_main_*
filter_main_exact:
ProcessName:
- 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe'
filter_main_startswith:
ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft'
Stage 3: not filter_optional_*
filter_optional_others:
ProcessName|endswith:
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
- '\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
- '\procexp.exe'
- '\procexp64.exe'
- '\procexp64a.exe'
- '\procmon.exe'
- '\procmon64.exe'
- '\procmon64a.exe'
filter_optional_dropbox:
ProcessName|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\'
ProcessName|endswith: '\Dropbox.exe'
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
PrivilegeList | eq |
| field:"PrivilegeList" kind:eq value:"SeLoadDriverPrivilege" |
Service | eq |
| field:"Service" kind:eq value:"-" |