Detection rules › Sigma

Certificate Use With No Strong Mapping

Status
test
Severity
medium
Log source
product windows, service system
Author
@br4dy5
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects a user certificate that was valid but could not be mapped to a user in a strong way (such as via explicit mapping, key trust mapping, or a SID) This could be a sign of exploitation of the elevation of privilege vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-34691, CVE-2022-26931, CVE-2022-26923) that can occur when the KDC allows certificate spoofing by not requiring a strong mapping. Events where the AccountName and CN of the Subject do not match, or where the CN ends in a dollar sign indicating a machine, may indicate certificate spoofing.

Known false positives

  • If prevalent in the environment, filter on events where the AccountName and CN of the Subject do not reference the same user
  • If prevalent in the environment, filter on CNs that end in a dollar sign indicating it is a machine name

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Privilege EscalationNo specific technique

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

title: Certificate Use With No Strong Mapping
id: 993c2665-e6ef-40e3-a62a-e1a97686af79
status: test
description: |
    Detects a user certificate that was valid but could not be mapped to a user in a strong way (such as via explicit mapping, key trust mapping, or a SID)
    This could be a sign of exploitation of the elevation of privilege vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-34691, CVE-2022-26931, CVE-2022-26923) that can occur when the KDC allows certificate spoofing by not requiring a strong mapping.
    Events where the AccountName and CN of the Subject do not match, or where the CN ends in a dollar sign indicating a machine, may indicate certificate spoofing.
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16
author: '@br4dy5'
date: 2023-10-09
modified: 2025-09-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name:
            - 'Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center'
        EventID:
            - 39
            - 41 # For Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 and Windows Server 2008 SP2
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If prevalent in the environment, filter on events where the AccountName and CN of the Subject do not reference the same user
    - If prevalent in the environment, filter on CNs that end in a dollar sign indicating it is a machine name
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    Provider_Name:
        - 'Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center'
        - 'Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center'
    EventID:
        - 39
        - 41

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Provider_Nameeq
  • Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center corpus 4 (sigma 4)
field:"Provider_Name" kind:eq