Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection

Status: experimental
Group by: "user.groups{}", "user.username", cluster_name, src_ip
Author: Rod Soto, Splunk
Source: github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects unauthenticated requests made against the Kubernetes Pods API, indicating potential unauthorized access attempts. It leverages the aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks data source, filtering for events where user.username is "system:anonymous", verb is "list", and objectRef.resource is "pods", with requestURI set to "/api/v1/pods". This activity is significant as it may signal attempts to access sensitive resources or execute unauthorized commands within the Kubernetes environment. If confirmed malicious, such access could lead to data compromise, unauthorized command execution, or lateral movement within the cluster.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Discovery	`T1526` Cloud Service Discovery

Rule body splunk

name: Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection
id: dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002
version: 7
creation_date: '2020-04-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Rod Soto, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects unauthenticated requests made against the Kubernetes Pods API, indicating potential unauthorized access attempts. It leverages the `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` data source, filtering for events where `user.username` is "system:anonymous", `verb` is "list", and `objectRef.resource` is "pods", with `requestURI` set to "/api/v1/pods". This activity is significant as it may signal attempts to access sensitive resources or execute unauthorized commands within the Kubernetes environment. If confirmed malicious, such access could lead to data compromise, unauthorized command execution, or lateral movement within the cluster.
data_source: []
search: |-
    `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI="/api/v1/pods"
      | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI)
        BY src_ip cluster_name user.username
           user.groups{}
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives.
known_false_positives: Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.
references: []
analytic_story:
    - Kubernetes Scanning Activity
asset_type: Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1526
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI="/api/v1/pods"

Stage 2: `rename`

| rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip

Stage 3: `stats`

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI)
    BY src_ip cluster_name user.username
       user.groups{}

Stage 4: `search`

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: `search`

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 6: `search`

| `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`"user.username"`	eq	`"system:anonymous"`
`objectRef.resource`	eq	`pods`
`requestURI`	eq	`"/api/v1/pods"`
`sourcetype`	eq	`aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks`
`verb`	eq	`list`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body splunk

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `rename`

Stage 3: `stats`

Stage 4: `search`

Stage 5: `search`

Stage 6: `search`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body splunk

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

Stage 2: rename

Stage 3: stats

Stage 4: search

Stage 5: search

Stage 6: search

Indicators

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `rename`

Stage 3: `stats`

Stage 4: `search`

Stage 5: `search`

Stage 6: `search`