Detection rules › Splunk
AnyDesk Execution from Suspicious Folder (Windows Event Log)
Adversaries may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. This use case detects when remote access software AnyDesk is executed outside of standard install locations
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control | T1219 Remote Access Tools |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaml
id: '13702.20067'
title: AnyDesk Execution from Suspicious Folder
description: 'Adversaries may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software
to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within
networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software,
and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. This use
case detects when remote access software AnyDesk is executed outside of standard
install locations. -- Threat Actor Association: Alloy Taurus/Gallium, Gamaredon
(aka. Armageddon, UAC-0010), Muddled Libra, Scattered Spider (aka. 0ktapus, UNC3944),
Scatter Swine, UNC2659 - Software Association: Akira, ALPHV/BlackCat, AvosLocker,
BianLian, BlackByte, BumbleBee, Clop, Conti, Diavol, Rhysida, Royal -- Atomics T1219
Test #2'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) TERM(AnyDesk) | regex process_path!="(?i)(AppData)|(Program\sFiles\\AnyDesk)|(Program\sFiles\s\(x86\))"|
where match(process_name, "(?i)^anydesk.exe$") | table _time, host, user, process,
process_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- command-and-control:remote access software
technique_id:
- T1219
data_category:
- Windows event logs
- Process command-line parameters
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) TERM(AnyDesk)
Stage 2: regex
| regex process_path!="(?i)(AppData)|(Program\sFiles\\AnyDesk)|(Program\sFiles\s\(x86\))"
Stage 3: where
| where match(process_name, "(?i)^anydesk.exe$")
Stage 4: table
| table _time, host, user, process, process_*
Stage 5: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 6: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
process_path | regex_match | "(?i)(AppData), (Program\sFiles\AnyDesk), (Program\sFiles\s(x86))" |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
process_name | match |
|
Search terms
Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | AnyDesk |