AnyDesk Execution from Suspicious Folder (Windows Event Log)

Group by: _time, host
Source: github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. This use case detects when remote access software AnyDesk is executed outside of standard install locations

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Command & Control	`T1219` Remote Access Tools

References

https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows

Telemetry coverage

Provider	Record / event type
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688: A new process has been created.

Rule body

id: '13702.20067'
title: AnyDesk Execution from Suspicious Folder
description: 'Adversaries may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software
  to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within
  networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software,
  and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. This use
  case detects when remote access software AnyDesk is executed outside of standard
  install locations. -- Threat Actor Association: Alloy Taurus/Gallium, Gamaredon
  (aka. Armageddon, UAC-0010), Muddled Libra, Scattered Spider (aka. 0ktapus, UNC3944),
  Scatter Swine, UNC2659 - Software Association: Akira, ALPHV/BlackCat, AvosLocker,
  BianLian, BlackByte, BumbleBee, Clop, Conti, Diavol, Rhysida, Royal -- Atomics T1219
  Test #2'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) TERM(AnyDesk) | regex process_path!="(?i)(AppData)|(Program\sFiles\\AnyDesk)|(Program\sFiles\s\(x86\))"|
  where match(process_name, "(?i)^anydesk.exe$") | table _time, host, user, process,
  process_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- command-and-control:remote access software
technique_id: 
- T1219
data_category:
- Windows event logs
- Process command-line parameters
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) TERM(AnyDesk)

Stage 2: `regex`

| regex process_path!="(?i)(AppData)|(Program\sFiles\\AnyDesk)|(Program\sFiles\s\(x86\))"

Stage 3: `where`

| where match(process_name, "(?i)^anydesk.exe$")

Stage 4: `table`

| table _time, host, user, process, process_*

Stage 5: `bucket`

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: `stats`

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

Field	Kind	Excluded values	Search
`process_path`	regex_match	`"(?i)(AppData)`, `(Program\sFiles\AnyDesk)`, `(Program\sFiles\s(x86))"`	`excludes:process_path`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Field	Kind	Values	Search
`EventCode`	eq	`4688` corpus 317 (splunk 283, kusto 33, elastic 1)	`field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688"`
`process_name`	regex_match	`"(?i)^anydesk.exe$"` corpus 2 (splunk 2)	`field:"process_name" kind:regex_match`

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

Stage	Term
1	`"<EventID>4688<"`
1	`AnyDesk`