Detection rules › Splunk
ASL AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources
The following analytic identifies the creation of a new AWS IAM policy version that allows access to all resources. It detects this activity by analyzing AWS CloudTrail logs for the CreatePolicyVersion event with a policy document that grants broad permissions. This behavior is significant because it violates the principle of least privilege, potentially exposing the environment to misuse or abuse. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to AWS resources, leading to unauthorized actions, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the AWS environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts |
| Persistence | T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts |
| Privilege Escalation | T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts |
| Stealth | T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- AWSCloudTrail - CloudFormation policy created then used for privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Created CRUD S3 policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD DynamoDB policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD KMS policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of CRUD Lambda policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of DataPipeline policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of EC2 policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of Glue policy and then privilege escalation (Kusto)
Rule body splunk
name: ASL AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources
id: 22cc7a62-3884-48c4-82da-592b8199b72f
version: 9
creation_date: '2021-02-22'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the creation of a new AWS IAM policy version that allows access to all resources. It detects this activity by analyzing AWS CloudTrail logs for the CreatePolicyVersion event with a policy document that grants broad permissions. This behavior is significant because it violates the principle of least privilege, potentially exposing the environment to misuse or abuse. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to AWS resources, leading to unauthorized actions, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the AWS environment.
data_source:
- ASL AWS CloudTrail
search: |-
`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreatePolicy
| spath input=api.request.data
| spath input=policyDocument
| regex Statement{}.Action="\*"
| regex Statement{}.Resource="\*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region api.request.data
| rename actor.user.uid as user api.operation as action api.service.name as dest http_request.user_agent as user_agent src_endpoint.ip as src actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account cloud.provider as vendor_product cloud.region as vendor_region
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `asl_aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources and you must verify this activity.
references:
- https://bishopfox.com/blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
analytic_story:
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: AWS Account
mitre_attack_id:
- T1078.004
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/asl_ocsf_cloudtrail.json
sourcetype: aws:asl
source: aws_asl
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreatePolicy
Stage 2: spath
| spath input=api.request.data
Stage 3: spath
| spath input=policyDocument
Stage 4: regex
| regex Statement{}.Action="\*"
Stage 5: regex
| regex Statement{}.Resource="\*"
Stage 6: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 7: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region api.request.data
Stage 8: rename
| rename actor.user.uid as user api.operation as action api.service.name as dest http_request.user_agent as user_agent src_endpoint.ip as src actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account cloud.provider as vendor_product cloud.region as vendor_region
Stage 9: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 10: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 11: search
| `asl_aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Statement{}.Action | regex_match |
|
Statement{}.Resource | regex_match |
|
api.operation | eq |
|
sourcetype | eq |
|