Detection rules › Splunk
ASL AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail
The following analytic detects StopLogging events within AWS CloudTrail logs, a critical action that adversaries may use to evade detection. By halting the logging of their malicious activities, attackers aim to operate undetected within a compromised AWS environment. This detection is achieved by monitoring for specific CloudTrail log entries that indicate the cessation of logging activities. Identifying such behavior is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC), as it signals an attempt to undermine the integrity of logging mechanisms, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without observation. The impact of this evasion tactic is significant, as it can severely hamper incident response and forensic investigations by obscuring the attacker's actions.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment | T1685.002 Disable or Modify Tools: Disable or Modify Cloud Log |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- Account Security Configuration Changed (Panther)
- AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (Elastic)
- AWSCloudTrail - Changes made to AWS CloudTrail logs (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Config Service Resource Deletion Attempts (Kusto)
- AWSCloudTrail - Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs (Kusto)
- CloudTrail Stopped (Panther)
Rule body splunk
name: ASL AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail
id: 0b78a8f9-1d31-4d23-85c8-56ad13d5b4c1
version: 12
creation_date: '2024-05-22'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects `StopLogging` events within AWS CloudTrail logs, a critical action that adversaries may use to evade detection. By halting the logging of their malicious activities, attackers aim to operate undetected within a compromised AWS environment. This detection is achieved by monitoring for specific CloudTrail log entries that indicate the cessation of logging activities. Identifying such behavior is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC), as it signals an attempt to undermine the integrity of logging mechanisms, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without observation. The impact of this evasion tactic is significant, as it can severely hamper incident response and forensic investigations by obscuring the attacker's actions.
data_source:
- ASL AWS CloudTrail
search: |-
`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=StopLogging
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region
| rename actor.user.uid as user api.operation as action api.service.name as dest http_request.user_agent as user_agent src_endpoint.ip as src actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account cloud.provider as vendor_product cloud.region as vendor_region
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: User $user$ has stopped Cloudtrail logging for account id $vendor_account$ from IP $src$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: src
type: ip_address
analytic_story:
- AWS Defense Evasion
asset_type: AWS Account
mitre_attack_id:
- T1685.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.008/stop_delete_cloudtrail/asl_ocsf_cloudtrail_2.json
sourcetype: aws:asl
source: aws_asl
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=StopLogging
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region
Stage 4: rename
| rename actor.user.uid as user api.operation as action api.service.name as dest http_request.user_agent as user_agent src_endpoint.ip as src actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account cloud.provider as vendor_product cloud.region as vendor_region
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
api.operation | eq |
|
sourcetype | eq |
|