Detection rules › Splunk
ASL AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally
The following analytic detects when an EC2 snapshot is shared publicly by analyzing AWS CloudTrail events. This detection method leverages CloudTrail logs to identify modifications in snapshot permissions, specifically when the snapshot is shared outside the originating AWS account. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data stored in the snapshot. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the snapshot's data, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation of the compromised information.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Exfiltration | T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Access Removed (Elastic)
- AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Shared or Made Public (Elastic)
- AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally (Splunk)
- AWS Snapshot Made Public (Panther)
Rule body splunk
name: ASL AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally
id: 00af8f7f-e004-446b-9bba-2732f717ae27
version: 7
creation_date: '2022-10-04'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects when an EC2 snapshot is shared publicly by analyzing AWS CloudTrail events. This detection method leverages CloudTrail logs to identify modifications in snapshot permissions, specifically when the snapshot is shared outside the originating AWS account. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data stored in the snapshot. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the snapshot's data, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation of the compromised information.
data_source:
- ASL AWS CloudTrail
search: |-
`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=ModifySnapshotAttribute
| spath input=api.request.data path=createVolumePermission.add.items{}.group output=group
| search group=all
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region api.request.data
| rename actor.user.uid as user api.operation as action api.service.name as dest http_request.user_agent as user_agent src_endpoint.ip as src actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account cloud.provider as vendor_product cloud.region as vendor_region
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `asl_aws_ec2_snapshot_shared_externally_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
known_false_positives: It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.
references:
- https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/
- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.exfiltration.ec2-share-ebs-snapshot/
- https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/enumeration/loot_public_ebs_snapshots/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: AWS EC2 snapshot from user $user$ is shared publicly
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: src
type: ip_address
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
- Data Exfiltration
asset_type: EC2 Snapshot
mitre_attack_id:
- T1537
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/asl_ocsf_cloudtrail.json
sourcetype: aws:asl
source: aws_asl
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=ModifySnapshotAttribute
Stage 2: spath
| spath input=api.request.data path=createVolumePermission.add.items{}.group output=group
Stage 3: search
| search group=all
Stage 4: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 5: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region api.request.data
Stage 6: rename
| rename actor.user.uid as user api.operation as action api.service.name as dest http_request.user_agent as user_agent src_endpoint.ip as src actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account cloud.provider as vendor_product cloud.region as vendor_region
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 9: search
| `asl_aws_ec2_snapshot_shared_externally_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
api.operation | eq |
|
group | eq |
|
sourcetype | eq |
|