Detection rules › Splunk
ASL AWS SAML Update identity provider
The following analytic detects updates to the SAML provider in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the UpdateSAMLProvider event, analyzing fields such as sAMLProviderArn, sourceIPAddress, and userIdentity details. Monitoring updates to the SAML provider is crucial as it may indicate a perimeter compromise of federated credentials or unauthorized backdoor access set by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate identity federation, potentially leading to unauthorized access to cloud resources and sensitive data.
Known false positives
- Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| AWS | CloudTrail event UpdateSAMLProvider: Updates the metadata document for an existing SAML provider in IAM. |
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
Rule body
name: ASL AWS SAML Update identity provider
id: 635c26cc-0fd1-4098-8ec9-824bf9544b11
version: 7
creation_date: '2022-10-04'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects updates to the SAML provider in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `UpdateSAMLProvider` event, analyzing fields such as `sAMLProviderArn`, `sourceIPAddress`, and `userIdentity` details. Monitoring updates to the SAML provider is crucial as it may indicate a perimeter compromise of federated credentials or unauthorized backdoor access set by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate identity federation, potentially leading to unauthorized access to cloud resources and sensitive data.
data_source:
- ASL AWS CloudTrail
search: |-
`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=UpdateSAMLProvider
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region
| rename actor.user.uid as user api.operation as action api.service.name as dest http_request.user_agent as user_agent src_endpoint.ip as src actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account cloud.provider as vendor_product cloud.region as vendor_region
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `asl_aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
known_false_positives: Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf
- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
finding:
title: User $user$ from IP address $src$ updated the SAML provider
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: src
type: ip_address
analytic_story:
- Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
asset_type: AWS Federated Account
mitre_attack_id:
- T1078
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=UpdateSAMLProvider
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor.user.uid api.operation api.service.name
http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip actor.user.account.uid
cloud.provider cloud.region
Stage 4: rename
| rename actor.user.uid as user api.operation as action api.service.name as dest http_request.user_agent as user_agent src_endpoint.ip as src actor.user.account.uid as vendor_account cloud.provider as vendor_product cloud.region as vendor_region
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `asl_aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
api.operation | eq |
| field:"aws::eventName" kind:eq value:"UpdateSAMLProvider" |
sourcetype | eq |
| field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"aws:asl" |