Detection rules › Splunk

AteraAgent Installation - Windows (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, such as AteraAgent, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access software may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. This use case detects the installation of AteraAgent RMM.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Command & Control

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '29796.53836'
title: AteraAgent Installation - Windows
description: An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software
  to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within
  networks. These remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, such as AteraAgent,
  are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by
  application control within a target environment. Remote access software may be installed
  and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access
  or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system.
  They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection
  or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. This use case detects
  the installation of AteraAgent RMM.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` ((EventCode=1033) OR ">1033</EventID>")
  "MsiInstaller" "AteraAgent" | table _time, host, user, process_* | bin span=1s |
  stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- command-and-control:remote access software
technique_id: 
- T1219
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-from-icedid-to-domain-compromise
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/04f72b9e78f196544f8f1331b4d9158df34d7ecf/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_software_atera_rmm_agent_install.yml
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-ta450-uses-embedded-links-pdf-attachments-latest-campaign?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social_organic&utm_campaign=2024&utm_post_id=3c4043a3-313b-4b88-aca6-d74b47e16082
- https://www.atera.com/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` ((EventCode=1033) OR ">1033</EventID>") "MsiInstaller" "AteraAgent"

Stage 2: table

| table _time, host, user, process_*

Stage 3: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 4: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1">1033</EventID>"
1"MsiInstaller"
1"AteraAgent"