Detection rules › Splunk

AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
_time, aws::awsRegion, aws::recipientAccountId, user, vendor_product
Author
Bhavin Patel, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies an AWS IAM account with concurrent sessions originating from more than one unique IP address within a 5-minute window. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the DescribeEventAggregates event, to detect this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate a session hijacking attack, where an adversary uses stolen session cookies to access AWS resources from a different location. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access to sensitive corporate resources, leading to potential data breaches or further exploitation within the AWS environment.

Known false positives

  • A user with concurrent sessions from different Ips may also represent the legitimate use of more than one device. Filter as needed and/or customize the threshold to fit your environment.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Collection

Telemetry coverage

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

name: AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips
id: 51c04fdb-2746-465a-b86e-b413a09c9085
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-02-01'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies an AWS IAM account with concurrent sessions originating from more than one unique IP address within a 5-minute window. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically the `DescribeEventAggregates` event, to detect this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate a session hijacking attack, where an adversary uses stolen session cookies to access AWS resources from a different location. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access to sensitive corporate resources, leading to potential data breaches or further exploitation within the AWS environment.
data_source:
    - AWS CloudTrail DescribeEventAggregates
search: |-
    `cloudtrail` eventName = DescribeEventAggregates src_ip!="AWS Internal"
      | bin span=5m _time
      | rename user_name as user
      | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user_agent) as user_agent values(signature) as signature values(src) as src values(dest) as dest dc(src) as distinct_ip_count
        BY _time user vendor_account
           vendor_region vendor_product
      | where distinct_ip_count > 1
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install Splunk AWS Add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
known_false_positives: A user with concurrent sessions from different Ips may also represent the legitimate use of more than one device. Filter as needed and/or customize the threshold to fit your environment.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185/
    - https://breakdev.org/evilginx-2-next-generation-of-phishing-2fa-tokens/
    - https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2
finding:
    title: User $user$ has concurrent sessions from more than one unique IP address $src$ in the span of 5 minutes.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: src
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - Compromised User Account
    - AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: AWS Account
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1185
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`cloudtrail` eventName = DescribeEventAggregates src_ip!="AWS Internal"

Stage 2: bucket

| bin span=5m _time

Stage 3: rename

| rename user_name as user

Stage 4: stats

| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user_agent) as user_agent values(signature) as signature values(src) as src values(dest) as dest dc(src) as distinct_ip_count
    BY _time user vendor_account
       vendor_region vendor_product

Stage 5: where

| where distinct_ip_count > 1

Stage 6: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 7: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 8: search

| `aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.