Detection rules › Splunk
AWS CreateAccessKey
The following analytic identifies the creation of AWS IAM access keys by a user for another user, which can indicate privilege escalation. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where the user creating the access key is different from the user for whom the key is created. This activity is significant because unauthorized access key creation can allow attackers to establish persistence or exfiltrate data via AWS APIs. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS services, data exfiltration, and long-term persistence in the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1136.003 Create Account: Cloud Account |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- ASL AWS Create Access Key (Splunk)
- AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (Elastic)
- AWSCloudTrail - Creation of Access Key for IAM User (Kusto)
- New IAM Credentials Updated (Panther)
- Root Account Access Key Created (Panther)
- User impersonation by Identity Protection alerts (Kusto)
Rule body splunk
name: AWS CreateAccessKey
id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-03-02'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic identifies the creation of AWS IAM access keys by a user for another user, which can indicate privilege escalation. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where the user creating the access key is different from the user for whom the key is created. This activity is significant because unauthorized access key creation can allow attackers to establish persistence or exfiltrate data via AWS APIs. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS services, data exfiltration, and long-term persistence in the environment.
data_source:
- AWS CloudTrail CreateAccessKey
search: |-
`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success
| eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0)
| search match=0
| rename user_name as user
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY signature dest user
user_agent src vendor_account
vendor_region vendor_product
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `aws_createaccesskey_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
references:
- https://bishopfox.com/blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/
analytic_story:
- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
asset_type: AWS Account
mitre_attack_id:
- T1136.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail
source: aws_cloudtrail
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success
Stage 2: eval
| eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0)
match =10Stage 3: search
| search match=0
Stage 4: rename
| rename user_name as user
Stage 5: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY signature dest user
user_agent src vendor_account
vendor_region vendor_product
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `aws_createaccesskey_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
errorCode | eq |
|
eventName | eq |
|
match | eq |
|
sourcetype | eq |
|
userAgent | ne |
|