Detection rules › Splunk

AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
aws::awsRegion, aws::recipientAccountId, aws::userAgent, dest, signature, src, user, vendor_product
Author
Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects UpdateTrail events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It identifies attempts to modify CloudTrail settings, potentially to evade logging. The detection leverages CloudTrail logs, focusing on UpdateTrail events where the user agent is not the AWS console and the operation is successful. This activity is significant because altering CloudTrail settings can disable or limit logging, hindering visibility into AWS account activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, compromising the integrity and security of the AWS environment.

Known false positives

  • While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has updated cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

name: AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail
id: 7c921d28-ef48-4f1b-85b3-0af8af7697db
version: 12
creation_date: '2022-07-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects `UpdateTrail` events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It identifies attempts to modify CloudTrail settings, potentially to evade logging. The detection leverages CloudTrail logs, focusing on `UpdateTrail` events where the user agent is not the AWS console and the operation is successful. This activity is significant because altering CloudTrail settings can disable or limit logging, hindering visibility into AWS account activities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, compromising the integrity and security of the AWS environment.
data_source:
    - AWS CloudTrail UpdateTrail
search: |-
    `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateTrail eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success
      | rename user_name as user
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY signature dest user
           user_agent src vendor_account
           vendor_region vendor_product
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable CloudTrail logs in your AWS Environment.
known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has updated cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/
finding:
    title: User $user$ has updated a cloudtrail logging for account id $vendor_account$ from IP $src$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: src
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - AWS Defense Evasion
asset_type: AWS Account
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1685.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateTrail eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success

Stage 2: rename

| rename user_name as user

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY signature dest user
       user_agent src vendor_account
       vendor_region vendor_product

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.