Detection rules › Splunk

AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
aws::awsRegion, aws::recipientAccountId, aws::userAgent, dest, key_policy_action, key_policy_principal, signature, src, user, vendor_product
Author
Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the creation of AWS KMS keys with an encryption policy accessible to everyone, including external entities. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify CreateKey or PutKeyPolicy events where the kms:Encrypt action is granted to all principals. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised account, allowing an attacker to misuse the encryption key to target other organizations. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data encryption, potentially disrupting operations and compromising sensitive information across multiple entities.

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Impact

Telemetry coverage

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

name: AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA
id: c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e
version: 11
creation_date: '2020-10-27'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of AWS KMS keys with an encryption policy accessible to everyone, including external entities. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `CreateKey` or `PutKeyPolicy` events where the `kms:Encrypt` action is granted to all principals. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised account, allowing an attacker to misuse the encryption key to target other organizations. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data encryption, potentially disrupting operations and compromising sensitive information across multiple entities.
data_source:
    - AWS CloudTrail CreateKey
    - AWS CloudTrail PutKeyPolicy
search: |-
    `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy
      | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{}
      | mvexpand key_policy_statements
      | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action
      | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{}
      | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1,key_policy_action_2)
      | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS
      | search key_policy_action="kms:Encrypt" AND key_policy_principal="*"
      | rename user_name as user
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY signature dest user
           user_agent src vendor_account
           vendor_region vendor_product key_policy_action
           key_policy_principal
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/
    - https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M
finding:
    title: AWS account is potentially compromised and user $user$ is trying to compromise other accounts.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Ransomware Cloud
asset_type: AWS Account
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1486
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy

Stage 2: spath

| spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{}

Stage 3: mvexpand

| mvexpand key_policy_statements

Stage 4: spath

| spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action

Stage 5: spath

| spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{}

Stage 6: eval

| eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1,key_policy_action_2)

Stage 7: spath

| spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS

Stage 8: search

| search key_policy_action="kms:Encrypt" AND key_policy_principal="*"

Stage 9: rename

| rename user_name as user

Stage 10: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY signature dest user
       user_agent src vendor_account
       vendor_region vendor_product key_policy_action
       key_policy_principal

Stage 11: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 12: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 13: search

| `aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.